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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters on the economics of the Internet.
The first chapter begins with presenting the advertising spending patterns of US local restau-
rants that have different ratings on Yelp.com. Rating information on Yelp includes display ratings
and review distributions. The Yelp’s rounding algorithm creates a discontinuity in display ratings.
Therefore, I use a regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of a higher display rating on
local restaurants’ advertising spendings. I find a significantly negative effect of display rating for
highly-rated restaurants on advertising. However, when the display rating is constant between two
steps, the relationship between local restaurant advertising spending and average rating is signifi-
cantly positive.
The second chapter uses a game-theoretic model to analyze competing firms’ advertising and
pricing decisions. Here customer reviews are available and firms may build up loyal customer
bases. I find that highly-rated firms are more likely to advertise more, i.e., online reviews com-
plement advertising. Comparative static results can explain the results found in the first chapter.
Intuitively, when the capacity of a local business becomes limited, a jump in the display rating
will reduce the complementary effect of online reviews on advertising. I also analyze an extension
of the model, where an entrant and an incumbent interact. I find that customer reviews undo the
“fat-cat” effect of a large incumbent with lots of loyal customers.
The third chapter proposes a new explanation for adoption failure or delay in markets with
network effects. In the model, consumers and software providers play a dynamic adoption game.
v
Each group of players choose between two incompatible technologies. Consumers may wait, but
firms may not. Although efficiency requires one technology to be adopted by all consumers and
firms right away, there is a “market split and adoption delay” equilibrium. In this equilibrium
some consumers choose to wait at first and firms split between the two technologies. The model is
motivated by the 56K modem market, in which competition between two technologies appears to
have led to adoption failure, until an industry standard setting organization coordinated the market
on an alternative standard.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Advertising Response to A Better Online Rating: A Regression Discontinuity Design
with US Local Restaurants and Yelp Reviews
This paper presents the advertising spending patterns of US local restaurants that have different
ratings on Yelp.com. Rating information on Yelp includes display ratings and review distributions.
The Yelp’s rounding algorithm creates a discontinuity in display ratings. Therefore, I use a regres-
sion discontinuity design to identify the effect of a higher display rating on local restaurants’ adver-
tising spendings. I find a significantly negative effect of display rating for highly-rated restaurants
on advertising. However, when the display rating is constant between two steps, the relationship
between local restaurant advertising spending and average rating is significantly positive.
1.1 Introduction
A lot of research have been done on online reviews, but few has noticed the different economic
effects of different types of reviews information. This paper studies two rating information on
Yelp.com: display rating and average rating, and estimates local restaurants’ advertising responses
to these two rating information. Surprisingly, although they are both rating information, advertising
changes differently in response to display rating and average rating.
The display rating on Yelp.com is the colored stars displayed below the name of a local busi-
ness. It rounds the average rating to the nearest half-star.
The average rating of a local restaurant cannot be directly observed. Yet consumers can click
the details button to see the entire distribution of the customer reviews of this restaurant. Comparing
two restaurants with different distributions of reviews, consumers can get a visual approximation
of the average ratings of these two restaurants.
Average rating is a measure of how consumers like the product of a restaurant (or a local
business in general). For local businesses providing consumer goods, the likelihood of consumer
satisfaction better describes the product quality than the cost of input in producing the good. There-
2fore, aggregating user generated reviews, the average rating can represent the quality reputation of
a local business among consumers. This paper do not assume that consumers are sophisticated
enough to compute the precise number of average rating from the distribution of reviews. Aver-
age rating is merely a summary statistic used to represent the quality reputation revealed from the
distribution of reviews.
If there is only average rating and no display rating, consumers learn the quality reputation
and firms respond to it. With the addition of display rating, in fact no extra information is newly
created. Will it change firms’ advertising responses? In this paper we will see the twist brought by
the display rating on restaurants’ advertising strategies, and justification will be provided.
Due to the rounding algorithm, the Yelp display rating has several jump thresholds. At each
threshold, the display rating jumps by half a star. Restaurants with similar average rating randomly
allocate above and below each threshold, and this randomness enable us to identify the effect of
display rating on local restaurants’ advertising spending. A sharp RD design is implemented and
the validity is justified with a rich set of tests for manipulation on reviews.
The display rating is constant between every two adjacent thresholds. Therefore the pattern in
advertising spending on the between-threshold intervals shows the relationship between advertising
and average rating, as if there is no display rating.
This paper provides the first detailed comparison between different types of rating information
on their relationship with firms’ marketing strategies. And the interesting finding is that, although
display rating and average rating are both rating information, local restaurants’ advertising spend-
ing responds in entirely opposite directions to them.
1.2 Literature Review
To identify the effect of online reviews on sales or firms’ decisions, we usually need to take differ-
ences across review sites or over time or both to eliminate the product quality fixed effects and/or
review site fixed effects. Chevalier and Mayzlin [2006] apply a difference-in-difference approach
on the book reviews data from Amazon.com and BN.com over three time points. Chen et al. [2007]
3use a first-difference approach with book reviews on Amazon.com over a 195 day period.
In recent years, the development in Regression Discontinuity design applications (Imbens and
Lemieux [2008]; Lee and Lemieux [2010]) allows us to identify treatment effects without incurring
the complexity resulting from comparing with a different website or with a different time point.
Anderson and Magruder [2012] use RDD to analyze the effect of a higher Yelp rating on restaurant
reservation availability. In this paper, I use RDD to identify local restaurants’ advertising response
to a higher Yelp display rating.
1.3 Data
To estimate the effect of Yelp display rating on advertising spending, I combine data on local
restaurants from two sources. The first dataset contains the annual advertising spending amount
in 2014 of local restaurants in the United States.1 This dataset contains each local restaurant’s
total advertising spending amount as well as their advertising spending in each DMA (Designated
Market Area) region. The advertising dataset does not distinguish between different advertising
channels, i.e., the advertising spending of each restaurant is the sum of ad spending in all major
multimedia channels, including TV, magazines, Internet, newspapers, radio, outdoor, etc.
The second dataset is scripted from Yelp.com and contains the corresponding Yelp reviews
and other information of those local restaurants in the advertising dataset. In particular, for each
restaurant in this dataset, I recorded the number of reviews of each star-rating (1 to 5), as of January
2014. Other information of restaurants that I collected from Yelp.com include price range, attire,
waiter service, delivery, etc.
I merge the two datasets together, therefore the final dataset contains advertising, Yelp reviews
and other information of each restaurant. The average rating can be calculated for each restaurant.
This calculated average rating is the true average rating of each restaurant, as opposed to their
round-off displayed rating on Yelp.
Even though the dataset contains only local restaurants, there are some difference among these
1The local restaurants in this dataset are the restaurants in Kantar Media database with classification code G310, as
opposed to national restaurants which have classification code G320.
4restaurants. A few restaurants advertise in more than one DMA markets, and a few restaurants are
not listed on Yelp.com. In the main body of the analysis in this paper, I focus on the restaurants
that advertise in only one DMA markets because the restaurants that advertise in multiple markets
are likely to have very different marketing strategies from those entirely local restaurants. I also ex-
clude those restaurants that are not listed on Yelp.com because Yelp rating is crucial in the analysis.
Summary statistics for the dataset and some subsets are provided in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Restaurant On Yelp
Restaurants off Yelp
All Restaurant Single Market
Mean
(SD)
Median Range Mean
(SD)
Median Range Mean
(SD)
Median Range
Reviews per restaurant 76.996
(180.980)
26 0 − 6267 73.512
(170.971)
26 0 − 6267
Restaurant average rating 3.579
(0.583)
3.615 1 − 5 3.585
(0.584)
3.620 1 − 5
Advertising spending 12.724
(44.290)
3.2 0 − 2792.4 9.743
(28.731)
2.7 0.1 − 1125.9 11.039
(34.243)
2.9 0 − 637.2
Observations 13360 11510 1075
Note: “Single Market” denotes the subsample of restaurants that advertise in only one market.
This paper studies the effect of a higher Yelp display rating on local restaurant advertising
spending. Therefore, the exclusion of restaurants that are off Yelp.com does not affect the estimates
and conclusions here. The effect of the exclusion of restaurants that advertise in multiple markets
is unclear at this point and will be checked as a robustness test.
1.4 Empirical Analysis and Results
Yelp display rating rounds off a restaurant’s average rating to the nearest half-star. This algorithm
creates discontinuity at each .25 and .75 thresholds. In particular, the correspondence between
5display ratings and average ratings is:
Display rating =

1, if average rating ∈ [1, 1.25)
1.5, if average rating ∈ [1.25, 1.75)
2, if average rating ∈ [1.75, 2.25)
2.5, if average rating ∈ [2.25, 2.75)
3, if average rating ∈ [2.75, 3.25)
3.5, if average rating ∈ [3.25, 3.75)
4, if average rating ∈ [3.75, 4.25)
4.5, if average rating ∈ [4.25, 4.75)
5, if average rating ∈ [4.75, 5]
Restaurants around each threshold have similar average ratings, but the ones at and above each
threshold have an extra 0.5 star in Yelp display rating. Between every two thresholds, the display
rating is constant as the average rating increases. Using average rating as the assignment variable,
I implement a sharp RD design to analyze the effect of having an extra half-star in Yelp display
rating. Tests of the possibility of manipulation are discussed in Section ??. In these tests we do not
see evidence of manipulation, and therefore the RD design is valid.
1.4.1 Graphical Analysis
To begin the RD analysis, I present the plots of binned local average of advertising spending around
selected thresholds of average rating. Figure 1.1 contains the binned scatter plots around thresholds
3.25, 3.75, 4.25 and 4.75 of average rating. Thresholds are marked by the dashed vertical lines.
The upper-left panel is for the average ratings within the range [2.75, 3.75) , and in this panel
the display rating changes from 3 on the left of the threshold (3.25) to 3.5 on the right of the
threshold. Similarly, the upper-right panel shows the average advertising spending as the display
rating changes from 3.5 to 4, the lower-left panel is when the display rating changes from 4 to 4.5,
6and the lower-right panel is when the display rating changes from 4.5 to 5.
Figure 1.1: Binned Scatters of Ad Spending by Average Rating around Thresholds 3.25, 3.75, 4.25
and 4.75
From the plots, we can see clear graphical evidence of jumps in advertising spending when the
display rating goes up by a half-star, especially at thresholds 3.75, 4.25 and 4.75.
1.4.2 Regression Analysis and Results
Let Xi denote the assignment variable (or forcing variable), i.e., the average rating of each restau-
rant, and c denote the RD thresholds (1.25, 1.75, ...) as listed above. Around each threshold, I
estimate the regression:
yi = α + τI(Xi ≥ c) + f (Xi − c) + δZi + i (1.1)
where yi is the advertising spending level of a restaurant, f (·) is a flexible functional form, and
Zi is a set of additional restaurant covariates. The effect of an extra half-star of display rating on
advertising spending is then estimated by the coefficient τ.
Following the suggestions by Gelman and Imbens [2014], I do not use higher order polynomial
7regressions. I use local linear regressions in the main body of this paper, and check for robustness
with local quadratic polynomial regressions. In particular, around each threshold, I regress
yi = α + β1(Xi − c) + τI(Xi ≥ c) + β2(Xi − c)I(Xi ≥ c) + δZi + i (1.2)
where the coefficient τ still estimates the effect of an extra half-star in display rating for restaurants
around threshold c. I estimate this local linear regression at each threshold, and then I run a pooled
regression to combine all thresholds and estimate an average effect of display rating on advertising
spending.
First, I estimate (1.2) separately for each threshold, and the regression results at selected thresh-
olds are given in Table 1.2. The four columns in this table correspond to the four graphs in Figure
1.1. Column (1) estimates the effect of increasing Yelp display rating from 3 to 3.5 on local restau-
rants’ advertising spending. The regression result tells that if the display rating increases from 3
to 3.5, restaurants on average reduce advertising spending by 3839 dollars. The effect of display
rating for restaurants around threshold 3.75, as shown in column (2), is also significantly negative,
and the average drop in advertising spending is even larger, i.e., an extra half-star induces an av-
erage drop of 5473 dollars in ad spending. The estimate in column (3) is insignificant. Compared
to the clear and big jump in the corresponding plot (lower-left panel) in Figure 1.1, reasons for the
insignificance of the estimate here might be the smaller number of observations and the relatively
big variance across restaurants. I expect to see significant effect of an extra half-star at threshold
4.25 if more observations are available. In column (4), most of the estimates around threshold 4.75
are insignificant due to the small number of observations.
The estimated effect of display rating (i.e., τˆ) at thresholds 3.25 and 3.75 are robust to various
bandwidth choices (between 0.1 to 0.5). The estimate for threshold 4.25 becomes more significant
as the bandwidth increases.2 At the threshold 4.75, the number of observations is too small even
when we change the bandwidth, and the estimated effect of display rating is not significant enough
to draw conclusion.
2With bandwidth 0.5, the estimate equals -2.420 with standard error 1.481, which is almost significant at the 10%
level.
8Table 1.2: The Effect of An Extra Half-Star in Display Rating on Ad Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above 3.25 −3.839
(1.822)
∗∗
Above 3.75 −5.473
(2.153)
∗∗
Above 4.25 −1.097
(2.202)
Above 4.75 −3.475
(2.579)
Dressy 2.589
(2.494)
0.906
(2.625)
3.411
(2.685)
6.013
(2.890)
∗∗
Waiter −2.615
(1.666)
−3.652
(1.878)
∗ −4.425
(1.501)
∗∗∗ −1.052
(1.361)
Delivery −1.216
(1.189)
−0.887
(1.483)
−3.042
(1.452)
∗∗ −0.586
(1.299)
Price $$ 1.848
(1.379)
1.641
(1.651)
1.386
(1.347)
0.026
(1.243)
Price $$$ 5.417
(2.105)
∗∗∗ 3.188
(2.461)
4.189
(2.501)
∗ −0.855
(2.316)
Price $$$$ −0.513
(5.786)
3.601
(5.598)
1.402
(4.416)
−5.182
(4.553)
Constant 13.091
(2.062)
∗∗∗ 15.895
(2.268)
∗∗∗ 10.332
(1.895)
∗∗∗ 8.761
(2.067)
∗∗∗
Notes. The dependant variable is advertising spending (unit:
USD Thousands). The variable “Average rating” is normalized
by the corresponding threshold in each column, i.e., Xi − c. The
variable “Above threshold” in the interaction term corresponds
to the indicator variable in each column: “Above 3.25”, “Above
3.75”, “Above 4.25” and “Above 4.75” respectively. Bandwidth
is 0.25 in all columns. Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10%.
Given the similarities in the estimates for the four thresholds (3.25, 3.75, 4.25 and 4.75), I
combine all thresholds in a pooled regression. To pool all thresholds, I normalize each threshold to
zero, combine all observations, and estimate
yi = α + β1X˜i + τpoolI(X˜i ≥ 0) + β2X˜iI(X˜i ≥ 0) + δZi + i (1.3)
where X˜i = Xi − c and c is the nearest threshold to Xi. The average effect on advertising of an
extra half-star in Yelp rating is captured by τpool. The regression results are given in Table 1.3.
The first column pools thresholds 3.25, 3.75, 4.25 and 4.75, which have clear and similar effects
of display rating in the above RD estimates. The second column pools all thresholds from 1.25 to
4.75, and uses the entire sample. The pooled RD estimates are not sensitive to the extension of
pooling thresholds. We can see from the two columns that, an extra half-star on average reduces
advertising spending by more than three thousand dollars.
9Table 1.3: RD Estimates of the Pooled Regression
(1) (2)
Average rating (normalized) 5.506
(5.409)
5.581
(4.952)
Above threshold (extra half-star) −3.549
(1.252)
∗∗∗ −3.188
(1.133)
∗∗∗
Average rating × Above threshold −3.716
(8.280)
−1.551
(7.500)
Notes. Dependant variable is ad spending for both columns.
Column (1) uses the sub-sample of restaurants with average rat-
ing above 3. Column (2) uses the full sample of restaurants
(with both Ad and Yelp information). Bandwidth used in the
pooled regresion is 0.25 stars. Significance levels: *** 1%, **
5%, * 10%.
1.5 Robustness
1.5.1 Higher-Order Polynomial Regressions
Although the plots in Figure 1.1 show mostly linear relationships, to ensure the effects of Yelp
rating are estimated correctly, I check the robustness of the estimated effects to second order poly-
nomial regressions. In particular, for thresholds from 3.25 to 4.75, I estimate
yi = α+β1(Xi−c)+γ1(Xi−c)2+τI(Xi ≥ c)+β2(Xi−c)I(Xi ≥ c)+γ2(Xi−c)2I(Xi ≥ c)+δZi+i (1.4)
and the regression results are given in Table 1.4.
Since higher-order polynomial regressions work better with wider bandwidths (Lee and Lemieux
[2010], I use bandwidth of 0.3 stars for threshold 3.25 and 0.5 stars for thresholds 3.75, 4.25 and
4.75 in the local quadratic regressions.3 We find that the estimates for thresholds 3.75 and 4.25
are close to those from the local linear regressions. At the threshold 3.25, the estimated drop in
advertising due to an extra half-star is even bigger than that from the local linear regression.
3For threshold 3.25, using bandwidth 0.3 gives the best goodness of fit. The estimates for thresholds 3.75 are robust
to various bandwidth choices. But the estimates for thresholds 4.25 and 4.75 are still not significant for most bandwidth
choices.
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Table 1.4: RD Estimates With Quadratic Polynomial Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above 3.25 −6.604
(3.436)
∗
Above 3.75 −6.387
(2.013)
∗∗∗
Above 4.25 −0.799
(2.178)
Above 4.75 −0.261
(4.335)
Average rating 72.625
(43.352)
∗ 15.793
(13.611)
−12.568
(12.169)
5.708
(20.789)
Average rating2 260.221
(140.827)
∗ 6.593
(26.466)
−23.975
(21.858)
12.524
(34.024)
Average rating × Above threshold −65.210
(53.296)
−4.293
(19.043)
5.611
(22.673)
−74.733
(79.644)
Average rating2× Above threshold −263.594
(172.604)
−30.368
(38.364)
37.445
(50.502)
258.691
(277.143)
Observations 3394 6670 4199 1198
Notes. The dependent variable is advertising spending (unit: USD Thousands). The
variable “Average rating” is normalized by the corresponding threshold in each column,
i.e., Xi − c. The variable “Above threshold” in the interaction term corresponds to the
indicator variable in each column: “Above 3.25”, “Above 3.75”, “Above 4.25” and
“Above 4.75” respectively. Bandwidth is 0.3 in column 1, and 0.5 in other columns.
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
1.6 Validation Tests of RD Design
To ensure the validity of the RD design, I conduct a rich set of tests, including the routine tests
used for RD designs and an additional group of tests for the possibility of reviews manipulation.
From these tests, we can see that the RD design in this paper is valid, and therefore we have correct
estimates.
1.6.1 Density of Assignment Variable
The first set of tests is the routine check for the discontinuity in the density of the assignment
variable, i.e. the average rating. The purpose of checking for the discontinuity in average rating is
to ensure that there is no manipulation in the sorting, which would undermine the validity of the
RD design. In principle, we do not need the continuity in the assignment variable. But looking at
the density and the results from related tests will help us determine the likelihood of manipulation
by firms.
The density of average rating is plotted in Figure 1.2. We can see there are a lot of jumps,
especially at each half-star and whole-star thresholds. And the jumps at the RD thresholds, i.e.
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Figure 1.2: Density of Average Rating
Table 1.5: Percentiles of Reviews
Percentiles Reviews Per Restaurant
5% 0
10% 2
25% 9
50% 26
75% 71
90% 179
95% 305
99% 824
Observations 13360
the .25 and .75 thresholds, are within the usual range of bin-to-bin jumps in this histogram plot.
The nontrivial magnitude and amount of jumps from this graph point to the fact that average rating
calculated from a small number of reviews will be very discrete.
Most local restaurants have a small number of customer reviews. As Table 1.5 shows, a large
percent of restaurants have a small number of reviews. The average ratings of these restaurants will
become several mass points in the density plot. And this discreteness, which is not resulting from
manipulation, will interfere with our test for the manipulation. Therefore, I adjust the test on the
density to the particular context of this research.
As a first step, I separate the dataset to two equal size parts, one with restaurants that have no
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Figure 1.3: Density of Average Rating For Two Subsamples
more than 26 reviews, and one with restaurants that have more than 26 reviews.4 Analyses will
be conducted on these two subsamples separately, and compared with the test on the full sample.
Histograms for the two subsamples are given in Figure 1.3. It is clear that the big jumps in the
density histogram of the full sample (Figure 1.2) are mostly from the subsample with reviews less
than 26. The density of average rating in the subsample with reviews more than 26 shows much
less discontinuity. In particular, the McCrary test (McCrary [2008]) is passed for the RD thresholds
3.25 and 3.75 where we see significant effects of display rating from the RD estimates in Section
4.
4Note, from Table 1.5, that 26 is the 50% percentile.
13
Table 1.6: RD Estimates of Jumps in Percentage of Five-Star Reviews
Sample ≤ 26 reviews > 26 reviews Full sample
(a) Pooled thresholds
(Display rating jumps by half a star)
Above threshold −0.088
(0.012)
∗∗∗ 0.014
(0.007)
∗ −0.037
(0.007)
∗∗∗
Observations 5634 6650 12284
(b) Around threshold 3.25
(Display rating jumps from 3 to 3.5)
Above threshold −0.017
(0.012)
0.008
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.006)
Observations 1472 1866 3338
(c) Around threshold 3.75
(Display rating jumps from 3.5 to 4)
Above threshold −0.005
(0.013)
0.001
(0.005)
0.003
(0.005)
Observations 1449 2716 4165
(d) Around threshold 4.25
(Display rating jumps from 4 to 4.5)
Above threshold −0.074
(0.019)
∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.006)
−0.044
(0.009)
∗∗∗
Observations 1194 1334 2528
Notes. This table gives the RD estimates of the jumps in the percentage of five-
star reviews from four regressions (a pooled regression and three regressions
around separate thresholds) conducted on each of three samples (two subsam-
ples and the full sample). Covariates are used to improve the precision of esti-
mates, but the estimated coefficients to them are not shown here. Significance
levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
1.6.2 Review Characteristics and Covariates
For the subsample with less reviews, it is meaningless to conduct the McCrary test of discontinuity
because the discontinuity might be entirely caused by the discreteness resulting from averaging
with a small number of reviews. But manipulation in reviews can be tested more directly and even
easier on this subsample by looking at the percentage of five-star reviews and the standard deviation
in review ratings. If a restaurant with a small number of reviews posts fake five-star reviews, the
percentage of five-star reviews will be easily driven higher, and the standard deviation in its review
ratings will appear much higher than other restaurants that have similar average rating and did not
manipulate the reviews. Therefore the next step is to check the percentage of five-star reviews and
the standard deviation in review ratings, in both subsamples as well as the full sample.
Table 1.6 shows the RD estimates of the effects of an extra half-star in display rating on the
percentage of five-star reviews. The regressions use specification (1.2) or (1.3) with the percent-
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Table 1.7: RD Estimates of Jumps in SD of Ratings
Sample ≤ 26 reviews > 26 reviews Full sample
(a) Pooled thresholds
(Display rating jumps by half a star)
Above threshold −0.012
(0.021)
−0.007
(0.008)
−0.026
(0.011)
∗∗
Observations 5634 6650 12284
(b) Around threshold 3.25
(Display rating jumps from 3 to 3.5)
Above threshold −0.127
(0.033)
∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.013)
−0.057
(0.016)
∗∗∗
Observations 1472 1866 3338
(c) Around threshold 3.75
(Display rating jumps from 3.5 to 4)
Above threshold −0.014
(0.027)
0.002
(0.009)
−0.0002
(0.011)
Observations 1449 2716 4165
(d) Around threshold 4.25
(Display rating jumps from 4 to 4.5)
Above threshold −0.222
(0.042)
∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.013)
−0.143
(0.022)
∗∗∗
Observations 1194 1334 2528
Notes. This table gives the RD estimates of the jumps in standard deviation of
ratings from four regressions (a pooled regression and three regressions around
separate thresholds) conducted on each of three samples (two subsamples and
the full sample). Covariates are used to improve the precision of estimates, but
the estimated coefficients to them are not shown here. Significance levels: ***
1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
age of five-star reviews in place of advertising spending, and are estimated using the subsample of
restaurants with no more than 26 reviews, the subsample with more than 26 reviews, and the full
sample. From both the pooled regression and the regressions at separate thresholds in each sam-
ple, we can see there is either no significant increase with precise estimates, or even a significant
decrease, in the percentage of five-star reviews above the thresholds.
Table 1.7 gives similar RD estimates using the standard deviation of rating instead of the per-
centage of five-star reviews. Regressions are also estimated at pooled thresholds or at separate
thresholds in each of the two subsamples as well as in the full sample. We again see no significant
increase with precise estimates at each threshold (or the pooled threshold).
These tests provide more direct evidence of the absence of reviews manipulation in this dataset
than the foregoing density checks. Checking the percentage of five-star reviews and the standard
deviation in ratings in the subsample with small number of reviews per restaurant provide a stronger
assurance because these small (in terms of the number of reviews) restaurants are the ones that are
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easier and more likely to manipulate their ratings by posting fake reviews.
I also checked the continuity in covariates that I used in the RD regressions, including Dressy,
Price, Waiter, Delivery and Reservation, and found no discontinuities in these covariates at the RD
thresholds. Therefore it is not the case that restaurants of a certain type are grouped above the jump
thresholds of display rating.
1.7 Discussion
The rounding algorithm that Yelp uses for display rating creates an exogenous change in display
rating as restaurants’ average ratings cross a threshold. Average rating correlates smoothly with a
restaurant’s quality reputation, whereas the display rating randomly jumps or drops by half a star
around each threshold.5 Therefore the RD estimates of the drops in advertising spending at each
threshold (or the pooled threshold) show us how local restaurants are changing their advertising
strategy in response to an increase in Yelp display rating.
Display rating is only part of the rating information on Yelp.com. To have a complete picture
of local restaurants’ advertising response to their online ratings, we also need to look at how adver-
tising changes with the rest of rating information on Yelp, i.e., the distribution of reviews. Here I
use the mean statistic, i.e., the average rating, to summarize the distribution of reviews. This is not
implying that the average rating can fully summarize the distribution, but rather that the average
rating reveals the quality reputation which is conveyed through the distribution of reviews.
The contrast between the quality reputation information generated by consumers and the dis-
play rating generated by the exogenous rounding algorithm is the key comparison in this research.
When display rating jumps, the quality reputation revealed from the distribution reviews is almost
constant. Therefore the advertising response to display rating is not responding to consumers’
belief about a restaurant’s quality. On the other hand, by studying how advertising responds to av-
erage rating in the following step, we will see how advertising changes with the restaurants’ quality
reputation.
5That restaurants have no (complete) control on the display rating is ensured by the validation tests in the preceding
section.
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Table 1.8: Pooled RD With Interval Dummies
Subsamples
Full Sample Price $$ Price $$$
Average rating (normalized) 2.811
(1.551)
∗ 3.202
(1.882)
∗ 6.660
(5.572)
Above threshold −1.085
(0.351)
∗∗∗ −1.257
(0.421)
∗∗∗ −2.309
(1.190)
∗
Average rating × Above threshold −0.854
(2.349)
−1.339
(2.823)
3.407
(8.157)
Dressy 0.838
(0.454)
∗ −0.556
(0.887)
1.144
(0.617)
∗
Waiter −0.931
(0.301)
∗∗∗ −1.023
(0.443)
∗∗ −10.686
(5.788)
∗
Delivery −0.511
(0.236)
∗∗ −0.329
(0.278)
−0.164
(1.437)
Reservation 0.176
(0.213)
0.345
(0.230)
−0.620
(1.970)
Price $$ 0.384
(0.262)
Price $$$ 1.337
(0.424)
∗ ∗ ∗
Price $$$$ 0.311
(0.898)
Constant 6.018
(1.909)
∗∗∗ 5.677
(2.303)
∗∗ 14.235
(11.429)
Observations 10197 6996 1076
Two-tail p value
Test: β1 + β2 = 0 0.27 0.37 0.09
Notes. This table shows the pooled RD estimates using advertising spending
as the dependent variable in all three columns. The regressions are on the full
sample, the subsample with restaurants of price level $$, and the subsample with
restaurants of price level $$$. Average rating is normalized to the nearest half-
star threshold. Outliers are ruled out. The bottom row gives the p value from
the two-sided test of the slope of advertising by average rating above thresholds.
Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Because from Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.4 (in appendix 1.9.1) we can see the between-threshold
intervals have similar advertising patterns, I pool all RD thresholds together and estimate the overall
trend of advertising spending when average rating is increasing while the display rating is constant.
I normalize the average rating by its nearest half-star threshold, and assign a dummy variable for
each interval with length 0.5 star around a threshold. Using the specification (1.3) with a group of
interval dummies, the estimates are given in Table 1.8.
The first column of Table 1.8 contains the pooled RD estimates using advertising spending
as the dependent variable. The sample contains all local restaurants that advertise in only one
market. Outliers are excluded. In particular, I exclude the restaurants that advertise more than
$50,000 in 2014, and these restaurants constitute about 3% of this sample. Pooling all thresholds
together, we can see that the slope of advertising over average ratings to the left of thresholds is
significantly positive (2.811). The slope to the right of thresholds has a positive point estimate
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(βˆ1 + βˆ2 = 1.957). From the two-tail test the slope is significant from zero at 73% confidence level,
but with the positive point estimate, we can reject against the alternative hypotheses that βˆ1 + βˆ2 > 0
at 86.5% confidence level.
Yelp categorizes restaurants to four price ranges: $,$$,$$$, and $$$$.6 The price range $$
covers the largest group of restaurants. Price ranges $ and $$$ have similar numbers of restaurants,
and the range $$$$ has only a little more than 100 restaurants in this entire sample of over 13,000
restaurants. Column 2 and column 3 provide the pooled RD estimates on the subsample of price
range $$ and the subsample of price range $$$.
The big subsample of price range $$ (column 2) has similar regression estimates as those in
the full sample (column 1). The slope of advertising over average ratings to the left of thresholds is
significantly positive (3.202), but the slope to the right of thresholds is positive at a lower confidence
level (81.5%). The subsample of price range $$$ (column 3) has a little different estimates than
those in column 1 and 2. The slope of advertising on the left of thresholds is positive (6.660)
yet with a not very precise estimate. However, the slope to the right of thresholds is significantly
positive with confidence level 95.5%.
The subsamples of price range $ and $$$$ have either too big variance or too small number
of observations for us to have precise estimates, and the estimates on these two subsamples are
therefore not shown here.
In general we can see from the estimation results that, apart from the jump thresholds, i.e.,
when the display rating is constant, higher advertising spending is associated with higher average
ratings.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper I study the advertising spending of local restaurants as their Yelp display rating
changes or as their average rating changes. Surprisingly the advertising responds in opposite direc-
tions to the changes in display rating and in average rating.
6Approximate cost per person: $= under $10, $$= $11-$30, $$$= $31-$60, $$$$= above $61
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From the RD design estimates, we find the advertising spending decreases significantly as the
display rating jumps at the thresholds above 3. In other words, when the Yelp display rating is
above 3, every time the display rating jumps by 0.5 star, local restaurants significantly reduce their
advertising spending. The display ratings below 3 do not have significant effect on advertising
spending.
From the pooled RD regression with interval dummies, we see that higher advertising spending
levels are associated with higher average ratings on the between-threshold intervals, where the
display rating is not changing. Average rating summarizes how consumers think about the quality
of a restaurant (in their reviews). This finding implies that restaurants with better quality reputation
are advertising more.
The key reason that we are seeing this opposite advertising response to the two rating informa-
tion is the capacity limit of local businesses. A higher display rating increases the click rates of a
restaurant and brings more “searchers”, i.e., consumers who search for unknown (nearby) restau-
rants. Therefore the display rating drives up the “volume”. As analyzed in Chapter 2, a higher
average rating, keeping the display rating constant, increases new consumers’ willingness to pay
because they can see a better quality reputation from the higher average rating. So the average
rating drives up the “margin”.
While both the “volume” increase and the “margin” increase bring higher profits for restaurants,
the capacity limit of local restaurants will become binding if the display rating is high enough. To
explain using the model in Chapter 2, the benefit of advertising comes from the additional group
of new consumers that are attracted by the advertisements. As the “volume” increase becomes big
enough (when the display rating is high enough), the benefit of advertising will be crowded out and
eventually goes to zero. Intuitively, if the “searchers” are enough to fill the seats in a restaurant, this
restaurant would have no benefit from bringing more new consumers by advertising. Note that the
“margin” increase will never be bound by the capacity limit, and is therefore “the more the better”.
Therefore as the display rating gets high enough, advertising decreases because it becomes less
profitable but is still costly. On the other hand, as the average rating increases, advertising increases
because the profit margin increases.
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Further investigation will be conducted using a dynamic setting. In a dataset with restaurants’
reviews and advertising spending at different points of time, we can look at how advertising affects
the mobility of average rating to higher intervals and complete our study on the interaction between
advertising and online ratings.
1.9 Appendix
1.9.1 RD Graphs at Lower Thresholds
Figure 1.4: Binned Scatter Plots of Ad Spending by Average Rating around Lower Thresholds
The four panels in this figure are the RD graphs showing the jumps at thresholds 1.25, 1.75, 2.25
and 2.75. We can see there are no clear discontinuities at these thresholds. And this graphical
interpretation also matches the regression results which show that there are insignificant drops in
advertising spending at these four thresholds with precise estimates.
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Chapter 2
How Do Firms Advertise When Customer Reviews Are Available?
This paper uses a game-theoretic model to analyze competing firms’ advertising and pricing deci-
sions. Here customer reviews are available and firms may build up loyal customer bases. I find that
highly-rated firms are more likely to advertise more, i.e., online reviews complement advertising.
Comparative static results can explain the results found in the first chapter. Intuitively, when the
capacity of a local business becomes limited, a jump in the display rating will reduce the comple-
mentary effect of online reviews on advertising. I also analyze an extension of the model, where an
entrant and an incumbent interact. I find that customer reviews undo the “fat-cat” effect of a large
incumbent with lots of loyal customers.
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, customer reviews have become an important part of consumers’ shopping experi-
ence. The percentage of consumers who read reviews (occasionally or regularly) before purchase
to determine the quality of a business has been steadily increasing, and in 2015 this number reached
92%.1 When consumers can get information about firms’ qualities from online customer reviews,
how do firms compete when they have different reviews? In particular, my paper studies competing
firms’ advertising strategies when customer reviews are available, and combining with data, offers
new insights on the interaction between online customer reviews and informative advertising: Are
they substitutes or complements?
Previous research finds that reviews, specifically good reviews, are a substitute for advertising,
and in particular, that firms with better reviews advertise less. However, I introduce two realistic
features that complicate this story. The first is loyal customers. In particular, consumers that are
satisfied with a local business not only leave good reviews, and they will also return and become
1Data source: The Local Consumer Review Survey by BrightLocal. This survey was conducted over 2 weeks in July
each year, starting from 2010. The 2015 survey has 2,354 entries with 90% of respondents coming from the US and
10% from Canada.
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loyal customers. Second, in many cases, advertising and reviews offer different types of informa-
tion. Whereas advertising informs consumers about the existence of a product or raises consumer
awareness, reviews offer a more credible source of information about quality. I show these features
interact to generate surprising results about the relationship between reviews and advertising.
I consider a non-durable experience good. For such a good, consumers’ individual values
are initially unknown and can be learned only after purchase, and each consumer may purchase
more than once. Advertising for an experience good, as Nelson [1970] points out, cannot convey
direct information of product quality because consumers will not trust such information that is not
verifiable before purchase. Indirect information that advertising may carry includes a product’s
existence and price.
By advertising, a firm informs new consumers about the existence of its product, and these
informed consumers will have access to the firm’s price and reviews before purchase. A familiar
example is consumers see various types of advertisements of a local restaurant, and then go to
Yelp.com to check this restaurant’s reviews and menu (including prices). There are also some other
less obvious forms of advertising. Consider the example of Amazon.com: firms need to pay a fee
($39.99) per month to be listed and sell on Amazon. Shoppers visiting Amazon can see all listed
firms’ prices and reviews. Therefore, advertising in my paper can be interpreted more generally as
a marketing tool that raises awareness of consumers about a product, and consequently makes the
price and reviews of this product observable to those consumers.
Customer reviews in my model are reports of individual satisfaction from previous buyers.
Consumers have heterogeneous preferences, and each consumer may be satisfied or dissatisfied
with a product. Before purchase, individual satisfactions are unknown and all consumers are ex ante
homogeneous. Consumers who see reviews of a product, see how previous buyers were satisfied
with it, and will use these reviews to update their belief about the likelihood of themselves being
satisfied with the product. I assume that consumers report truthfully, but this assumption can be
relaxed and does not affect the conclusions.
I define a product’s quality to be its ex ante satisfaction likelihood for a new consumer. That
is, a higher quality product has a higher probability, ex ante, to make a random new consumer
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satisfied. A new firm’s product quality is unknown, and consumers and firms hold a common prior
belief about it. As a firm receives reviews from its buyers, the belief about its product quality will
be updated according to Bayes’ rule.
In this model, two firms with unknown qualities compete with each other. Firms first choose
whether or not to advertise, and after observing each other’s advertising decision, firms choose
prices. There are a finite number (n) of consumers randomly drawn from the population to become
“shoppers”. (Justifications can be the group of consumers who consider having lunch at a local
restaurant today in a certain neighborhood, or the group of consumers who visit Amazon.com to
search for a specific product in a month.) Only firms that choose to advertise are known to the n
shoppers. If only one firm advertises, it can charge a monopoly price. But if both firms advertise,
they need to compete for the shoppers in price.
I consider the competition between two firms that have operated for some periods, and hence
have already received some reviews. The good reviews that a firm receives come from its previous
buyers who were satisfied with their purchase. I assume satisfied previous buyers will repeat pur-
chase and become “loyal customers” of this firm.2 Firms know about their own and each other’s
loyal customer base (because they are automatically aware of each other and can see each other’s
reviews). If a firm advertises, the new shoppers will be able to see this firm’s reviews and use them
to update the belief about this firm’s product quality. The shoppers make purchase decisions based
on both prices and reviews of the advertised firm(s).
For a firm with some reviews and a nonzero loyal customer base, in choosing a price, this
firm trades off between charging a high price to sell only to loyal customers, and lowering price
to attract new shoppers. In the price competition between two advertised firms, there is no pure
strategy equilibrium if at least one firm owns nonzero loyal customers. However, there is a unique
mixed strategy equilibrium, in which both firms randomize pricing, and the firm with better reviews
and more loyal customers randomizes over a higher range of prices.
In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage advertising-pricing game, firms’
advertising strategies will depend on how differently the two firms are rated in their reviews. If
2Repeat purchase from loyal customers is a very important part of local restaurants’ business.
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firms are similarly rated, there will be multiple equilibria and one firm advertises only if the rival
does not. In other words, advertising is a strategic substitute for similarly rated firms. However,
if one firm is rated much better than the rival, the better-rated firm is the only one that advertises.
Therefore, having a relatively higher rating helps a firm to be dominant in advertising.
In an extension, I show that these conclusions still hold if I allow a group of consumers to search
for firms. The “Searchers” do not need to receive advertisements to be informed about firms, and
they can see all firms’ prices and reviews. This robustness check makes the implications of my
model applicable to a more general case, where consumers may search but firms can advertise to
reach more consumers.
In the main body of this paper, I consider the case where two firms have the same number of
previous buyers. But the conclusions also hold if two firms have different numbers of previous
buyers, i.e. asymmetric firm histories. In particular, I extend the main model to an entry deterrence
problem which can be interpreted as an extreme case of asymmetric firm histories. An incumbent
firm interacts with a potential entrant, and entry happens if the entrant chooses to advertise. The
incumbent already has some reviews from previous buyers, and owns a loyal customer base. In
this extension, I find that entry can be deterred if the incumbent was successful enough in the past,
i.e. has a high ratio of good reviews. There is an interesting interpretation of my model vis--vis the
“fat-cat” effect as in Fudenberg and Tirole [1984]. When the incumbent has a big group of loyal
customers (a “fat cat”), in Fugenberg and Tirole’s model, it should be weak in the competition with
potential entrants. However, with the availability of customer reviews, if the incumbent has a large
enough percentage of good reviews, it will successfully deter entry and is therefore a “fat-but-strong
cat”.
Finally, I use data on local restaurants’ advertising spending and Yelp reviews to test the model
prediction and find supporting evidence on the positive effect of a higher average rating on restau-
rants’ advertising spending. In addition, by using a Regression Discontinuity Design, I successfully
separate the effect of display rating from the effect of average rating.3 In the discussion section,
3See Figure [fig:Yelp page example] in Appendix 2 for an example Yelp web page showing the display rating and
the average rating of a restaurant.
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I explain why we observe these two effects having opposite directions in their relationship with
advertising.
2.2 Literature Review
My paper first contributes to the literature of advertising (for a review, see Bagwell [2007]), and
in particular relates to the papers on informative advertising for experience goods. Nelson’s sem-
inal paper (Nelson [1970]) differentiates between search goods and experience goods, and starts
a discussion about indirect informative advertising for experience goods Nelson [1974]. An im-
portant benefit of such advertising is creating repeat purchases. Following Nelson’s conjecture,
Schmalensee [1978], Kihlstrom and Riordan [1984], Milgrom and Roberts [1986] and Hertzendorf
[1993] have formally studied this repeat-purchase effect of advertising. Because of the various
restrictions these papers put on firms’ or consumers’ dynamic decisions, the repeat-purchase effect
has not been fully investigated. Although creating repeat purchases in the future is a long-term
benefit of advertising (the repeat-purchase effect), the current repeated purchases from previous
buyers reduces a firm’s incentive to advertise in the current period (the loyal-customer effect). In
my paper, I take the loyal-customer effect into account to study firms’ advertising strategies.
There have been several papers investigating the Bertrand price competition between firms
with loyal customers, and showing that such Bertrand games have no pure strategy equilibrium.
Varian [1980] and Narasimhan [1988] study the competition between firms when each firm has
an exogenous group of loyal customers (“uninformed consumers” in Varian [1980], and analyze
the mixed strategy equilibrium of the Bertrand game. In McGahan and Ghemawat [1994] and
Chioveanu [2008], firms are allowed to invest first in building their loyal customer bases. They both
assume that the size of a firm’s loyal customer base is determined with certainty by firms’ decisions
(service in McGahan and Ghemawat [1994] or persuasive advertising in Chioveanu [2008]. In this
paper, I study the two-stage advertising-pricing game, and the mixed strategy equilibrium only
happens in a subgame and actually serves as a threat to the firm without advantage in the price
competition.
25
Another literature that my paper contribute to is the one on customer reviews. There have
been many great papers showing the importance of online customer reviews. Using data on Ama-
zon.com and BN.com, Chevalier and Mayzlin [2006] show that online reviews are very influential
to consumers’ purchase decisions about books. Luca [2011] uses data from Yelp.com to study how
reviews affect firms’ sales and how consumers learn from reviews. Sun [2012] demonstrates how
the variance and the average of ratings interact in affecting firms’ sales.
Within this literature, my paper is closely related to a specific group of papers that studies
the interaction between firms’ marketing strategies and product reviews. Chen and Xie [2005]
study two competing firms’ advertising and pricing strategies in response to third-party product
reviews when a lot of consumers have strong preference on horizontal attributes. Mayzlin [2006]
talks about when firms post fake reviews in response to different ratings from customer reviews.
Another paper by Chen and Xie [2008] studies how a monopoly firm 1) chooses how much product
attribute information to reveal, 2) decides whether to make previous customer reviews available to
future consumers, and 3) proactively control the informativeness of customer reviews, for different
types of products. In Chen and Xie [2008], all customer reviews are the same and give one signal,
match or mismatch. My paper takes into account the heterogeneity in customer reviews and uses
Bayesian learning to model new consumers’ belief updating using these reviews. Therefore, when
firms are rated differently, their advertising strategies in competition will be different.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 3 gives the setting of the main model,
and Section 4 contains the equilibrium analysis, Section 5 contains two extensions: entry game
and Searchers model. In Section 6 I test the model prediction with data, Section 7 discusses the
empirical findings and Section 8 concludes.
2.3 Main Model
2.3.1 Players and Information
There is a continuum of consumers in the population, and a finite number (n ∈ N) of consumers
are randomly drawn to be shoppers. Each would like to buy at most one unit of a good. The good
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is an experience good. After purchase, a consumer derives either a value of 0 or 1 from consuming
the good, but this individual match value is unknown before purchase, and consumers are ex ante
homogeneous. I also assume that consumers are initially unaware about the availability of the good,
but they can be informed by firms through advertising.
Firm A and Firm B sell the good, and compete for only one period. Marginal cost of production
is assumed to be the same for both firms, and normalized to 0. An advertisement by a firm informs
shoppers about the availability of the firm’s product. If both Firms A and B advertise, the n shoppers
are informed of both firms’ goods. Advertising is a discrete-choice variable. A firm can choose
either to advertise (M = 1) or not to (M = 0). The cost of advertising is fixed and denoted by
c ∈ R+.
Let θA and θB denote, respectively, the probabilities that products of Firms A and B will yield
a value 1 to a shopper. Neither firms nor consumers know these probabilities ex ante. However,
it is common knowledge that θA and θB are drawn independently and identically from a uniform
distribution on [0, 1]. We may call θA and θB firms’ product qualities, or their types.
There is a special group of consumers, called “loyal customers”. If a previous buyer derives a
value of 1 from a firm’s product, this consumer will repeat purchase and become a “loyal customer”
of this firm thereafter. Assume that, at the beginning of this model, each firm has already built up a
loyal customer base, denoted by Lk, k = A, B. Let T A and T B denote the total number of previous
buyers of Firm A and Firm B respectively.4 Assume T A and T B are both finite numbers, i.e. Firms
A and B have not been operated for infinite periods, so that the ratio Lk/T k cannot predict precisely
the value of θk.
Customer reviews are defined to be consumers’ truthful reports of their satisfaction with a
product after consuming it. Reviews can be good (taking value 1), or bad (taking value 0). Assume
that all previous buyers wrote reviews.5 Firm A’s good reviews come from those previous buyers of
Firm A who derived value 1, and these consumers now constitute Firm A’s loyal customer base (LA).
4For this customer review model to be meaningful, assume at least one of T A and T B is nonzero. In other words,
assume at least one firm has some reviews.
5This assumption is not crucial and can be relaxed, because new consumers learn about a product’s quality only
through the available reviews. The shopping experience, good or bad, of those previous buyers who have not left
reviews failed to be conveyed to new consumers. What matters is the available reviews.
27
Firm A’s bad reviews come from the dissatisfied previous buyers of Firm A, T A − LA. Similarly,
for Firm B, the good reviews come from its satisfied previous buyers who now constitute Firm B’s
loyal customer base (LB), and bad reviews come from its dissatisfied previous buyers, T B − LB.
Once a consumer is aware of a firm’s existence, she will have free access to all of the firm’s
previous customer reviews, Lk good and T k − Lk bad, and the firm’s price pk. Firms can always see
each other’s previous customer reviews.
The firms and consumers interact over two stages in the single period.
Stage 1 (Advertising) Each firm chooses whether to advertise. The new consumers (n) are
informed by firms’ advertisements, and become aware of the advertised firm(s).
Stage 2 (Pricing) Observing each other’s advertising decision, firms now choose prices simulta-
neously. The new consumers have access to the advertised firms’ customer reviews and prices, and
then make purchase decisions. Each firm’s loyal customers repeat purchase.
If both firms advertise, the n shoppers choose between two firms based on their reviews and
prices. Loyal customers do not consider switching because they are already enjoying the highest
possible value – 1. I assume that a firm cannot discriminate between its loyal customers and new
shoppers. The same price is charged to all buyers.
If Firm A’s quality θA is known, after purchasing from Firm A, a consumer gets value 1 with
probability θA; analogously with probability θB if the purchase is from Firm B. However, two
firms’ qualities are unknown, to consumers and to firms themselves.6 The probability of being
satisfied (i.e., getting value 1) with a product is unknown, and everyone learns from firms’ previous
customer reviews.
6This assumption can be interpreted as the uncertainty about whether consumers will like the food of a restaurant. If
restaurant owners know exactly what consumers like, they will all provide the most favorable food, and we won’t see
bad reviews at all. However, obviously this is not true.
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2.3.2 Belief Updating
I assume consumers are rational. First, before knowing the individual value of a product, a rational
consumer updates her belief of the product quality according to Bayes’ rule. Second, a consumer
values a product by the expected quality in the initial purchase, and by her individual value of this
product in repeated purchases, and a consumer is rational in that she will not pay for prices above
her value of a product.
Recall that a firm’s product quality is defined to be the probability (θ ∈ [0, 1]) that its product
will yield a value 1 to a randomly chosen shopper. A belief about a firm’s quality is therefore
a probability distribution on [0, 1]. I use the Beta distribution to model beliefs.7 Good and bad
reviews of a firm can be viewed as successes and failures of Bernoulli trials, and all serve as signals
to update belief. For a prior belief that is described by a Beta distribution, after updating with the
Bernoulli trials, the posterior belief again follows Beta distribution, only with updated parameters.8
Specifically, the belief-updating process is as follows.
For a new firm with no reviews, the common prior belief of its quality is the Beta distribution
with parameters 1 and 1, Beta(1, 1), which is equivalent to the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. Let θ˜0
denote the expected quality of a new firm, then θ˜0 = 1/2. Therefore, all new firms share the same
prior belief and expected quality, 1/2, even though they may have different true qualities.
As firms start receiving reviews, the beliefs about their qualities will be updated. If a firm has
received a total number T of reviews, among which there are L good reviews, using Bayes’ rule,
the updated expected quality will be θ˜ = 1+L2+T .
Specifically, in this model, Firm A has, in total, T A reviews, and LA out of T A are good reviews.
Update the common prior belief, Beta(1, 1), with these good and bad reviews, and the posterior
belief will be distributed as Beta(1 + LA, 1 + T A − LA). Therefore, when consumers see Firm A’s
7The Beta distribution, Beta(a, b) (a and b are parameters), is a continuous distribution on [0, 1], and the expectation
is aa+b .
8For more details about the Beta distribution and its property of being a conjugate prior distribution, please refer to
DeGroot and Schervish [2011] (specifically p. 327-333 and Theorem 7.3.1 on p. 394).
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reviews, their belief is updated such that the expected quality of Firm A becomes
θ˜A =
1 + LA
2 + T A
(2.1)
Similarly, Firm B has LB good reviews, and T B − LB bad reviews. Therefore, updated with these
reviews, Firm B’s expected quality is
θ˜B =
1 + LB
2 + T B
(2.2)
Only new consumers need the reviews to update their beliefs. Loyal customers of each firm
have already learned their personal match value, which is 1, with the product they are buying.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this model, firms’ actions in Stage 1 are publicly observable in Stage 2, and once a firm has
advertised, new consumers and firms will have symmetric information about the advertised firm’s
(expected) product quality. Therefore, I solve by backward induction for the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium of this two-stage game.
At the beginning of Stage 1, the state of the game is described by two firms’ total reviews, T A
and T B respectively, and good reviews, LA and LB respectively. For the following analysis, I use
a special case where T A = T B = T > 0. The analyses for the other two cases, T A > T B ≥ 0 and
T B > T A ≥ 0, will be essentially the same, and are briefly explained in the Appendix.9
Each firm owns a loyal customer base, the size of which equals to the number of the firm’s
good reviews, Lk, k = A, B. These loyal customers are willing to pay price 1 for the firm’s product.
If the firm advertises, new consumers read its reviews and are willing to pay θ˜k = 1+L
k
2+T k < 1 for the
firm’s product.
By the equilibrium analysis of this two-stage game, we want to see firms’ advertising strategies
(Mk) in competition when they have different ratios of good reviews (Lk/T k).10 Advertising is
9An extreme case of the asymmetric previous-buyers setting is an entry game with an established incumbent and a
new entrant, T A > T B = 0, which is analyzed in Section 5 as an extension.
10The ratio of good reviews can be roughly corresponded to a firm’s rating.
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Table 2.1: The Normal Form of The Game
Firm A
MA = 1 MA = 0
Firm B
MB = 1 Pricing Subgame LA, (LB + n)θ˜B − c
MB = 0 (LA + n)θ˜A − c, LB LA, LB
costly (fixed cost c), and the benefit it brings is “expansion”: to expand a firm’s customer base and
sell to more consumers.
For a firm with nonzero loyal customers, if it does not expand (by advertising), it always has a
“secured profit” because this firm can charge price 1 to its loyal customers. So Firm A’s secured
profit is LA, and Firm B’s is LB. The existence of secured profit reduces a firm’s incentive to
advertise. When Firm A owns a group of loyal customers LA > 0, if the highest profit that Firm A
can obtain from expansion is lower than its secured profit (LA), Firm A will never choose to expand
(by advertising). The highest profit Firm A can get from expansion is when the opponent does not
advertise, and Firm A sells to all new consumers (n) and its loyal customers (LA) at the monopoly
price θ˜A: (LA + n)θ˜A − c. In other words, it is profitable for Firm A to expand through advertising
only if
(LA + n)θ˜A − c ≥ LA (2.3)
We say Firm A satisfies the “Profitable Expansion” (PE) condition if 2.3 is satisfied. Analogously,
Firm B satisfies the PE condition if
(LB + n)θ˜B − c ≥ LB (2.4)
If no firms satisfy the PE condition, the equilibrium will be trivial: no firm advertises and each
firm sells to its loyal customer base at price 1. If there is only one firm, say Firm A, that satisfies
the PE condition, the equilibrium will be that only Firm A advertises. And in this equilibrium, Firm
A charges a price pA = θ˜A to both new and loyal customers, while Firm B charges 1 and earns its
secured profit LB from loyal customers.
Suppose the state variables are such that both firms satisfy PE, i.e., both (2.3) and (2.4) hold,
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then the normal form of the game is as shown in Table 2.1. For subgames where at most one firm
advertises, the payoffs are straightforward. If both firms advertise, the n shoppers are aware of
both firms and can see all customer reviews. A pricing subgame follows, and I show next how two
established firms compete for new shoppers by price.
2.4.1 The Pricing Subgame
Firms have different expected qualities unless they have exactly the same number of good re-
views.11 The pricing subgame is therefore a Bertrand competition between firms producing goods
of different expected qualities (at the same cost 0). New shoppers choose the product from Firm A
if and only if
θ˜A − pA > θ˜B − pB (2.5)
Let d = θ˜A − θ˜B. Therefore, Firm A tends to undercut Firm B’s price pB by charging just below
pB + d, and similarly, Firm B tends to undercut Firm A by charging just below pA − d.
Unlike in common Bertrand games, firms here are unwilling to undercut each other all the way
down to the marginal cost of production (here it is 0). Because of loyal customers (and hence the
secured profit), there is a lowest price that a firm is willing to charge in the pricing subgame, which
I call the firm’s “reservation price” in the price competition. Firm A does not want to charge any
price that yields a lower profit from the price competition than Firm A’s secured profit LA2 , and the
lowest price that Firm A is willing to charge in the price competition satisfies (LA + n)pA = LA. So
I call Firm A’s reservation price
γA =
LA
LA + n
(2.6)
Similarly, Firm B’s reservation price in the price competition is
γB =
LB
LB + n
(2.7)
The existence of loyal customers creates jump discontinuities in firms’ best response functions
11Recall that I assume two firms have the same total number of reviews for now.
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in the pricing subgame. For each firm, the jump happens at the point of the firm’s reservation
price. If undercutting the rival requires Firm A to charge a price below its reservation price γA,
Firm A would rather charge price 1 to its loyal customers and do not sell to new shoppers. The
discontinuity at firms’ reservation prices, caused by the existence of loyal customers, leads to the
following lemma (see all proofs in the Appendix).
Lemma 1. When both firms advertise and compete in price for new shoppers, if at least one
firm has a nonzero loyal customer base, there will be no pure strategy equilibrium in this pricing
subgame.
The existence of loyal customers creates asymmetric information among consumers. Like
papers in the literature of price dispersion (Varian 1980; Chioveanu 2008), this asymmetry in in-
formation among consumers leads to a mixed strategy equilibrium. How firms act in the mixed
strategy equilibrium depends on the relationship between γA and γB + d (recall that d = θ˜A − θ˜B).
Intuitively, it depends on which firm can undercut the opponent further in the price competition. In
particular, if γA and γB satisfy
γA < γB + d, (2.8)
when Firm B charges its reservation price pB = γB, Firm A can undercut it by charging just below
γB + d, which is still above Firm A’s reservation price γA. I say Firm A satisfies the “Advantage
in Price Competition” (APC) condition if (2.8) is satisfied. Similarly, Firm B satisfies the APC
condition if
γA > γB + d. (2.9)
How the mixed strategy equilibrium depends on this inequality is shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider the pricing subgame when Firm A and Firm B both advertise. Suppose
that at least one of them has a nonzero loyal customer base. In particular, suppose Firm A has
a loyal customer base LA and expected quality θ˜A, and analogously Firm B has LB and θ˜B. This
pricing subgame has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium.
Let d = θ˜A − θ˜B, γA = LALA+n , γB = L
B
LB+n .
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(1) If Firm A has advantage in competition, i.e., (2.8) holds, in the mixed strategy equilibrium
(FA(p), FB(p)), Firm A gets an expected profit of (LA + n)(γB + d), Firm B gets an expected profit
of LB, and FA(p) first order stochastically dominates FB(p). The distribution functions in the
equilibrium are
FA(p) =

0 p ≤ γB + d
1 − LBn(p−d) + L
B
n γ
B + d ≤ p ≤ θ˜A
1 p ≥ θ˜A
and
FB(p) =

0 p ≤ γB
1 − (LA+n)(γB+d)n(p+d) + L
A
n γ
B ≤ p ≤ θ˜B
1 p ≥ θ˜B
(2) If Firm B has advantage in price competition, i.e., (2.9) holds, in the mixed strategy
equilibrium (FA(p), FB(p)), Firm A gets an expected profit of LA, Firm B gets expected profit
(LB + n)(γA − d), and FB(p) first order stochastically dominates FA(p). The distribution functions
in the equilibrium are
FA(p) =

0 p ≤ γA
1 − (LB+n)(γA−d)n(p−d) + L
B
n γ
A ≤ p ≤ θ˜A
1 p ≥ θ˜A
and
FB(p) =

0 p ≤ γA − d
1 − LAn(p+d) + L
A
n γ
A − d ≤ p ≤ θ˜B
1 p ≥ θ˜B
If a firm has advantage in price competition, it gets an expected profit from the pricing subgame
higher than its secured profit. The firm without advantage in price competition only earns the same
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Table 2.2: Payoffs When Condition APC-A Holds
Firm A
MA = 1 MA = 0
Firm B
MB = 1 (LA + n)(γB + d) − c, LB − c LA, (LB + n)θ˜B − c
MB = 0 (LA + n)θ˜A − c, LB LA, LB
(in expectation) as its secured profit. In general, a firm satisfies the APC condition if it has a
relatively higher ratio of good reviews. See the green area in Figure 2.1.
The APC condition only predicts the winner (in terms of expected profit) in the pricing subgame
if both firms have advertised. However, it does not give any information about whether the expected
winner might want to enter this pricing subgame.
2.4.2 Advertising Game
Without loss of generality, in the following analysis, I suppose Firm A satisfied the APC condition,
i.e., condition (2.8) holds.
From Proposition 1 and the fact that (2.8) is true (APC-A), in the pricing subgame after both
firms advertise, Firm A gets an expected payoff of (LA +n)(γB +d)−c, and Firm B gets an expected
payoff of LB − c. We now have payoffs in the pricing subgame, and the advertising game with
payoffs when APC-A holds is shown in Table 2.2.
Equilibria in cases where at least one firm do not satisfy the PE condition, i.e., (2.3) or (2.4)
does not hold, have been analyzed earlier, and here I study the equilibrium for the case where it is
profitable for both firms to expand through advertising. That is, (2.3) and (2.4) hold simultaneously.
From Table 2.2, we can see that Firm B (the firm that does not satisfy the APC condition)
advertises only if Firm A does not advertise. Firm A also advertises if Firm B does not, but it may
still choose to advertise even if Firm B advertises. Therefore, the relationship between Firm A’s
expected payoff from the pricing subgame, (LA + n)(γB + d) − c, and Firm A’s secured profit, LA,
determines how firms advertise in the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Consider the competition between two firms, Firm A with a loyal customer base
LA and expected quality θ˜A, Firm B with loyal customer base LB and expected quality θ˜B. Suppose
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Firm A satisfies the APC condition, i.e., (2.8) holds, and suppose both (2.3) and (2.4) are satisfied,
then,
1) If
(LA + n)(γB + d) − c ≥ LA, (2.10)
there is a unique equilibrium in which only Firm A advertises (MA = 1, pA = θ˜A; MB = 0, pB = 1).
2) If
(LA + n)(γB + d) − c < LA, (2.11)
there are multiple equilibria: i) only Firm A advertises (MA = 1, pA = θ˜A; MB = 0, pB = 1);
ii) only Firm B advertises (MA = 0, pA = 1; MB = 1, pB = θ˜B); and iii) both firms randomize
advertising with probabilities respectively λA = L
B−(LB+n)θ˜B+c
LB−(LB+n)θ˜B and λ
B =
LA−(LA+n)θ˜A+c
(LA+n)(γB−θ˜B) .
To summarize the equilibrium analysis, the advertising equilibrium is characterized by three
conditions on state variables (LA, LB,T A = T,T B = T ), or equivalently (LA, LB, θ˜A, θ˜B). The three
conditions are Profitable Expansion (PE), Advantage in Price Competition (APC), and Uniqueness
(U), and are summarized below.
Profitable Expansion (PE)
• (PE – Firm A) (LA + n)θ˜A − c > LA
• (PE – Firm B) (LB + n)θ˜B − c > LB
Advantage in Price Competition (APC)
• (APC – Firm A) γA < γB + d
• (APC – Firm B) γA > γB + d
Uniqueness (U)
• (U – Firm A) (LA + n)(γB + d) − c ≥ LA
36
���-�
��-�
��-�
���-� �-�
�-�
0 200 400 600 800
0
200
400
600
800
Firm A's loyal customers
Fi
rm
B
's
lo
ya
lc
us
to
m
er
s
Horizontal axis: LA; Vertical axis: LB
T A = T B = T
Figure 2.1: Three conditions to characterize equilibria
• (U – Firm B) (LB + n)(γA − d) − c ≥ LB
As Proposition 2 shows, the condition of equilibrium uniqueness for Firm A ( U − A) is relevant
only when both firms satisfy the PE condition (PE − A, and PE − B), and Firm A satisfies the APC
condition (APC − A). Similarly, U − B is relevant only when PE − A, PE − B and APC − B are
satisfied at the same time.
The interaction of the three conditions is shown in Figure 2.1. When two firms share the same
number of previous buyers, T A = T B = T , the state variables can be summarized by LA and
LB, which are the axes in Figure 2.1. Note that expected qualities (θ˜A, θ˜B) are increasing linear
functions of the corresponding loyal customer bases (LA, LB): The bigger a firm’s loyal customer
base is, fixing T , the higher is the firm’s expected quality (or rating).
Figure 2.1 shows that, the condition Uniqueness is satisfied only when the firm with advantage
in price competition (APC) has a much bigger loyal customer base than the rival. In other words,
if Firm A and Firm B have similar numbers of loyal customers (i.e. |LA − LB| is small), advertising
is a strategic substitute between two firms. In this case, there are multiple equilibria, and one firm
chooses to advertise only when the rival does not. However, if firms differ a lot in their loyal
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customer bases (i.e., |LA − LB| is big), advertising is a dominant strategy for the firm with more
loyal customers, and the firm with less will never advertise.
We can see from Figure 2.1 that the area of each Uniqueness condition is a strict subset of the
area of the corresponding APC condition. In particular, U − B is a strict subset of APC − B, and
U − A is a strict subset of APC − A. This observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If advertising cost is positive, c > 0, there exists a set of state variables (LA, LB,T A,
T B) such that multiple equilibria exist in the competition between two established firms.
The area of multiple equilibria is marked by black dashed lines in Figure 2.1. Proposition 3
is saying that this area is nonempty as long as advertising cost is positive (c > 0). Therefore, if
firms are rated similarly, multiple equilibria always exist, and one case we might see is that only
the worse-rated firm advertises.
If one firm does not satisfy the PE condition, i.e. expansion through advertising is not profitable
for this firm, whereas the other firm satisfies the PE condition, there is also a unique equilibrium
in which only the firm that satisfied PE advertises. If neither firm satisfies the PE condition, the
unique equilibrium is that no firm advertises. We can see from Figure 2.1 that a firm finds it
profitable to expand through advertising if its loyal customer base exceeds a certain level (fixing
T ).
Combining all cases in the entire set of state variables (0 ≤ LA ≤ T, 0 ≤ LB ≤ T ), I use
Figure 2.2 to illustrate the areas of different competition results. In the lower-left white block,
expansion is not profitable for either firm, so neither firm advertises. In the lower-right blue area,
Firm A has a much higher ratio of loyal customers (or good reviews) than Firm B, there is a unique
equilibrium and only Firm A advertises. Correspondingly, in the upper-left red area, there is a
unique equilibrium, and only Firm B advertises. In the upper-right green area, firms both have a
high ratio of good reviews, and their ratings differ a little, there are multiple equilibria, and either
firm might be the one that is advertising. We can see that a firm will be dominant in advertising if
it has a much higher ratio of good reviews.
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2.5 Extensions
In this section, I give two extensions of the main model. First, I consider an extreme case of the
main model in an entry setting. In this entry game, the incumbent is an established firm facing
potential entry, the incumbent and the entrant sequentially make advertising decisions, and if en-
try takes place, they compete in price. Customer reviews interact with advertising in the entry
deterrence problem.
In the second part, I consider an extension where a group of consumers are allowed to search
for firms and can see the reviews of each firm. Such consumers are called “Searchers”, and they do
not need to see advertisements to be informed about the existence of products. I check robustness
of the conclusions from the main model to this extension.
2.5.1 An Entry Game
The settings on the product and on consumers remain the same as the main model.
On the firm side there are two firms, an incumbent, Firm A, and a potential entrant, Firm B.
Firms’ true qualities, respectively θA and θB, are unknown.
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Firm A has operated for several periods, had T ∈ N previous buyers and LA ≤ T loyal cus-
tomers. Assume that T ≥ n. Firm A has a secured profit equal to LA. All previous buyers have
written reviews, so Firm A has T reviews in total, and LA out of them are good reviews (1’s).
Firm B, the entrant, has no previous buyers and thus no loyal customers and no reviews. As a
result, Firm B has no secured profit.
The incumbent and the entrant interact in three stages. In the first (pre-entry) stage, the incum-
bent, Firm A, chooses whether to advertise (MA = 1, 0). In the second (entry) stage, after observing
the incumbent’s advertising decision, the entrant, Firm B, chooses whether to enter and advertise
(MB = 1, 0). In the third (post-entry) stage, n shoppers are randomly drawn to receive advertise-
ments and see customer reviews (if exist) of the advertised firms, and firms simultaneously choose
prices.
Customer reviews of Firm A are observable to both firms and all informed shoppers. It is also
common knowledge that Firm B is a new firm and has no customer reviews nor loyal customers.
Therefore, firms and informed shoppers share the same belief that Firm A’s expected quality is
θ˜A = 1+L
A
2+T and Firm B’s expected quality is θ˜
B = 12 . Let d denote the difference between firms’
expected qualities, d = θ˜A − θ˜B = θ˜A − 12 .
Using backward induction, I solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the three-stage
game. As in the main model, the equilibrium here is characterized by three conditions, Profitable
Expansion (PE), Advantage in Price Competition (APC), and Uniqueness (U).
Before analyzing the equilibrium of the entry game, we need first to look at the PE condition.
If it is not profitable for the incumbent to expand, entry deterrence will never happen. If the entrant
does not satisfy the PE condition, entry will never happen.
The PE condition is defined in the same way as in the main model. Firm A satisfies the PE
condition if its loyal customer base LA and expected quality θ˜A satisfy (2.3). Firm B has LB = 0
and θ˜B = 12 , and satisfies PE if
1
2 n ≥ c. I assume that advertising is not too costly, specifically
c < 12 n, so that an entrant is willing to enter the market and advertise if there is no competition. In
other words, the entrant, Firm B, always satisfies the PE condition.
If expansion is not profitable for at least one firm, there will be no entry game. In the following
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study of entry deterrence, I consider only the case where both firms find it profitable to expand.
That is, suppose (2.3) is satisfied.
Third (post-entry) stage:
In the third stage, firms carry out pricing decisions. If entry did not happen in the second stage, i.e.,
Firm B did not advertise, the n shoppers will be aware only of Firm A. In this case, Firm A selects
its monopoly price, θ˜A, and sells to both loyal customers (LA) and new shoppers (n). Firm B does
not move in this stage because it did not enter the market.
If entry occurred (i.e., the entrant – Firm B – advertised), and Firm A also advertised, the n
shoppers will be aware of both firms, and Firm A and Firm B need to compete in price for these
new shoppers. Lemma 1 implies that as long as Firm A has a nonzero loyal customer base, there
is no pure strategy equilibrium of the price competition, and firms’ expected payoffs in the mixed
strategy equilibrium is determined by the condition “Advantage in Price Competition” (APC). In
the competition between an established firm and a new firm, we have the following lemma about
the APC condition.
Lemma 2. If the incumbent (Firm A) and the entrant (Firm B) have both advertised, then in
the pricing subgame of the third stage, Firm B has advantage in price competition (APC-B), i.e.,
γB < γA − d, for all values of LA and the corresponding θ˜A.
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 together provide us with the firms’ expected payoffs in the pric-
ing subgame after entry occurred. Firm A gets LA in expectation, and Firm B gets n(γA − d) in
expectation.
In an extreme case that the incumbent never satisfied consumers: if Firm A has no loyal cus-
tomers (LA = 0 and θ˜A = 12+T ), there is a pure strategy equilibrium of the pricing competition,
and firms get the same payoffs equal to the expected payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium, with
certainty. That is, Firm A does not sell and gets zero profit, and Firm B wins all new shoppers and
gets n(θ˜B − θ˜A) = n(γA − d).
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Figure 2.3: Stage 1 and Stage 2 of the entry game
First and second (pre-entry and entry) stage:
Given the (expected) payoffs in the third stage, I analyze how the incumbent and the entrant make
advertising decisions sequentially in Stage 1 and Stage 2. The game tree is shown in Figure 2.3.
If Firm A did not advertise in Stage 1, entry is accommodated and Firm B will advertise in Stage
2. If Firm A has advertised in Stage 1, Firm B may still enter and advertise if n(γA − d) − c ≥ 0. If
Firm B enters, Firm A eventually gets a payoff (LA − c) less than its secured profit LA.
Therefore, entering is a dominant strategy for Firm B if n(γA − d) − c ≥ 0 is satisfied. This is
exactly the “Uniqueness” condition in the main model. I call it the “Entry” condition here. If the
“Entry” condition is satisfied, Firm A will not advertise in Stage 1, and Firm B will enter and sell
to all new shoppers in the equilibrium. If the “Entry” condition is not satisfied, Firm A, having the
first-move advantage, will advertise, and Firm B will not enter. In this case, entry is successfully
deterred.
To sum up, there are two conditions relevant in this entry game:
(PE – Firm A): (LA + n)θ˜A − c ≥ LA
(Entry): n(γA − d) − c ≥ 0
The entry game is defined by two variables, Firm A’s loyal customer base LA and expected
quality θ˜A = 1+L
A
2+T . These two variables can be summarized by L
A alone. There are three parame-
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Figure 2.4: Conditions PE and Entry in the entry game
ters, previous buyers of Firm A (T ), new shoppers (n), and advertising cost (c). Firm A has operated
alone for more than one periods, therefore, T is assumed to be greater than n. Figure 2.4 shows
how the two conditions interact for different values of LA and the parameter c, fixing the values of
T and n.
We can see from Figure 2.4 that, 1) if advertising cost c is too small (c ≤ c1), entry always
occurs for all values of LA; 2) if advertising is too costly (c ≥ c2), whenever the incumbent (Firm
A) is willing to expand through advertising (i.e., satisfies the PE condition), entry will not occur;
and 3) for moderate advertising cost (c1 < c < c2), entry may still occur even when Firm A satisfies
the PE condition (LA ≥ L∗), and only if Firm A has a big enough loyal customer base (LA) relative
to its total previous buyers (b), then entry will be successfully deterred.
From this entry extension, I show that for an entry game with a moderate advertising cost (case
3), entry can be deterred only if the incumbent has a high enough ratio of loyal customers, or in
other words, only if the incumbent has a big percentage of good reviews.
Comparing this to what Fudenberg and Tirole [1984] show: when there are no customer re-
views, a big incumbent is weak in the competition with entrant and cannot deter entry. If customer
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reviews do not exist, even if the incumbent advertises, it will lose the price competition with the en-
trant. Therefore, in a world where customer reviews do not exist, the incumbent will not advertise
and cannot deter entry.
We see that the availability of customer reviews undoes the “fat-cat” effect of big incumbents,
and strengthens incumbents with a high ratio of good reviews.
2.5.2 Extension: Searchers
Now I consider an extension of the main model where “Searchers” are allowed. Searchers are a
group of consumers who are used to searching for firms instead of watching advertisements, like
the tech-savvy consumers. Searchers are not affected by firms’ advertisements, and can always
search for all firms and see each firm’s reviews and price.
Assume that there are two types of new consumers, the traditional new consumers and the
Searchers. Traditional consumers are the same as the consumers in the main model: they need
to see a firm’s advertisements to be informed about the firm’s existence. Searchers are as defined
above. Besides searching, there is no other difference between traditional new consumers and
Searchers. In other words, if a product has true quality θ, a traditional new consumer and a searcher
have the same probability (θ) of being satisfied in consuming this product.
In this model, there are n ∈ N traditional shoppers and s ∈ N Searchers. Each consumer
chooses between Firm A and Firm B, and purchase, at most, one unit of the good.
Firm A has LA loyal customers and an expected quality θ˜A = 1+L
A
2+T A , and Firm B has L
B loyal
customers, and an expected quality θ˜B = 1+L
B
2+T B .
The timing of the model is:
The s Searchers are aware of both firms, and have access to their customer reviews. Firms A
and B first make advertising decisions simultaneously. The n traditional shoppers are informed by
firms’ advertisements, and have access to the advertised firm’s customer reviews. After observing
each other’s advertising decision, firms choose prices. Traditional shoppers and Searchers then
make purchase decisions based on firms’ reviews and prices, and loyal customers of each firm
repeat purchases.
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The key difference of having Searchers is the option to compete for the group of Searchers even
if a firm does not advertise. Therefore, in this extension model, there is a pricing subgame for every
combination of firms’ advertising decisions, whereas in the main model (without Searchers), firms
compete in price only when both firms advertise. The four combinations are (MA = 1,MB = 1),
(MA = 1,MB = 0), (MA = 0,MB = 1) and (MA = 0,MB = 0).
Recall that in the pricing subgame, the condition “Advantage in Price Competition” (APC)
determines which firm wins the pricing subgame (in terms of expected profit). Here in the extension
with Searchers, we will have four APC conditions, one for each pricing subgame.
Pricing Subgame 1: MA = 1,MB = 1
This case is very close to the price competition in the main model. When both firms choose
to advertise, the traditional consumers are informed about the existence of both firms. Therefore,
now the traditional consumers and Searchers have exactly the same information, and can be viewed
as one group in this pricing subgame. Firm A and Firm B compete in price for these n + s new
consumers.
Given Firm A’s loyal customer base LA, the reservation price, γA11, of Firm A in this subgame
(MA = 1,MB = 1) is the lowest price that it is willing to charge in the price competition:
γA11 =
LA
LA + n + s
(2.12)
Similarly, Firm B has LB loyal customers, and the reservation price γB11 of Firm B in this pricing
subgame is
γB11 =
LB
LB + n + s
(2.13)
The APC condition in this subgame is denoted as APC11. The condition of Firm A having
advantage in price competition is APC11 − A:
γA11 < γ
B
11 + d (2.14)
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where d is the difference in ratings of two firms, d = θ˜A − θ˜B. Firm B has APC if (2.14) does not
hold.
If Firm A has advantage in this pricing subgame, i.e. APC11−A holds, Firm A wins this pricing
subgame (in terms of expected profit), and two firms expected profit will be:
piA11 = (L
A + n + s)(γB11 + d) − c
piB11 = L
B − c
Pricing Subgame 2: MA = 1,MB = 0
If only Firm A advertises, those n traditional consumers will not be aware of Firm B, and they
only consider buying from Firm A. However, two firms may compete for Searchers (s). Reservation
prices will be different because of the existence of Searchers.
For Firm A, it now has two reservation options in pricing. It may charge price pA = 1, and sell
only to its loyal customers LA. Or, it may charge price pA = θ˜A, and at least loyal customers LA
and traditional shoppers n will buy from Firm A for certain. Therefore, for any price p that Firm A
charges in pricing competition, it has to satisfy
p(LA + n + s) ≥ max{LA, (LA + n)θ˜A} (2.15)
Then Firm A’s reservation price in this pricing subgame is
γA10 =
max{LA, (LA + n)θ˜A}
LA + n + s
(2.16)
Firm B’s reservation option in pricing is still only one: charging pB = 1 and sell only to its
loyal customers LB. Therefore, Firm B’s reservation price in this pricing subgame is
γB10 =
LB
LB + s
(2.17)
Note that if s is small, γB10 will be close to 1, and higher than θ˜
B, which is the highest price that
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Searchers would accept for product B. Therefore, if only Firm A advertises, there will be competi-
tion for Searchers only when
γB10 ≤ θ˜B (2.18)
The APC condition in this pricing subgame is denoted as APC10. And APC10 − A is satisfied if
γA10 < γ
B
10 + d (2.19)
And again, APC10 − B is satisfied if (2.19) does not hold.
If Firm B is willing to compete for Searchers (i.e., (2.18) holds), and Firm A satisfies the APC
condition (i.e., (2.19) holds), two firms’ expected profits will be
piA10 = (L
A + n + s)(γB10 + d) − c
piB10 = L
B
Pricing Subgame 3: MA = 0,MB = 1
This subgame is similar to subgame 2, only with firms switching roles, so I will just list the
conditions for this subgame.
Firm A’s reservation price in this subgame is γA01 =
LA
LA+s , and Firm B’s reservation price in this
subgame is γB01 =
max{LB,(LB+n)θ˜B}
LB+n+s .
Firm A is willing to compete for Searchers only if
γA01 ≤ θ˜A (2.20)
The APC condition for this subgame is denoted as APC01, and APC01 − A is satisfied if
γA01 < γ
B
01 + d (2.21)
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If both (2.20) and (2.21) are satisfied, two firms’ expected profits will be
piA01 = (L
A + s)(γB01 + d)
piB01 = max{LB, (LB + n)θ˜B} − c
Pricing Subgame 4: MA = 0,MB = 0
If neither firm advertises, this pricing subgame will again be similar to the pricing subgame in
the main model, except that firms are now competing for Searchers, not traditional consumers.
The two firms’ reservation prices are γA00 =
LA
LA+s , γ
B
00 =
LB
LB+s . And they will compete for
Searchers only if
γA00 ≤ θ˜A (2.22)
γB00 ≤ θ˜B (2.23)
are both satisfied.
In this subgame, Firm A satisfies the APC condition, i.e. APC00 − A holds, if
γA00 < γ
B
00 + d (2.24)
If (2.22), (2.23) and (2.24) all hold, the two firms’ expected profits will be
piA00 = (L
A + s)(γB00 + d)
piB00 = L
B
Next, we will see how the four APC − A conditions interact with each other. For simplicity
of analysis, here I focus on the case where two firms have the same number of previous buyers:
T A = T B = T > 0.
As shown in Figure 2.5, all four APC − A conditions are satisfied when Firm A has a higher
ratio of good reviews than Firm B. That is, if Firm A has a much higher ratio of good reviews
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Horizontal axis: Firm A’s loyal customers LA
Vertical axis: Firm B’s loyal customers LB
Figure 2.5: Condition APC − A in four pricing subgames
Table 2.3: Firms’ Profits When s is Big, and LA > LB
MB = 1 MB = 0
MA = 1
(LA + n + s)(γB11 + d) − c (LA + n + s)(γB10 + d) − c
LB − c LB
MA = 0
(LA + s)(γB01 + d) (L
A + s)(γB00 + d)
max{LB, (LB + n)θ˜B} − c LB
than Firm B, Firm A will have advantage in price competition (APC) in all four pricing subgames.
And as the value of s increases, the four conditions converge to be the same area. Therefore, if the
group of Searchers (s) is very big, a firm either has advantage in price competition (APC) in all
four pricing subgames, or has APC in no pricing subgame.
Suppose the group of Searchers (s) is very big, and Firm A is the one with a higher ratio of good
reviews, and hence satisfies the APC conditions of all four pricing subgames. The profit functions
for each combination of advertising strategies by Firms A and B are provided in Table 2.3. We can
see from the table that when Firm A has advantage in price competition, if Firm A advertises, Firm
B never wants to advertise; but if Firm A does not advertise, Firm B would want to advertise. This
is the same as in the main model.
Next, let us see how Firm A’s advertising strategy here differs with the main model where there
are no Searchers. Recall that in the main model, the Profitable Expansion (PE) condition is defined
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such that a firm is willing to advertise when the opponent does not advertise. Here, the PE condition
for Firm A (PE-A) in the extension model with Searchers is
(LA + n + s)(γB10 + d) − c > (LA + s)(γB00 + d) (2.25)
which can be simplified to: n( L
B
LB+s + d) > c. If Firm A wants to advertise even when Firm B
chooses to advertise, we say the condition Uniqueness (U-A) is satisfied, that is, there will be a
unique equilibrium where only Firm A advertises. The condition (U-A) is
(LA + n + s)(γB11 + d) − c > (LA + s)(γB01 + d) (2.26)
When (2.25) and (2.26) are simultaneously satisfied, Firm A always advertises, regardless of Firm
B’s advertising decision, and the unique equilibrium is that only Firm A advertises.12 The intersec-
tion of these two conditions (PE-A and U-A) is illustrated by the red-contoured area in Figure 2.6.
In this area, Firm A advertises no matter what.
Compare the extension model with Searchers to the main model. The area of Firm A always
advertising in the main model is contoured by blue curves. We can see that Firm A (the one with
higher ratio of good reviews) has a bigger chance to be dominant in advertising when there are
Searchers. However, if the opponent (Firm B) has a very high ratio of good reviews already, it is
harder for Firm A to be dominant in advertising in the Searchers model than in the main model.
By this comparison, we see that the spirit of the main model still holds: having a high per-
centage of good reviews is important for a firm to win the competition, and the areas of unique
equilibrium and multiple equilibria all exist when there are Searchers. In particular, the equilib-
rium partition in the Searchers extension model is given in Figure 2.7.
12Note that conditions APC11 − A, APC10 − A, APC01 − A and APC00 − A are already satisfied, as we are considering
the case when s is big and LA > LB.
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2.6 Data Evidence
In this section I use advertising data and reviews data of local restaurants to test the main prediction
of my theoretical model: a firm with a relatively higher average rating, in general, advertises more.
I combine two datasets. The first dataset is obtained from the advertising spending database of
Kantar Media; it contains local restaurants’ advertising spending in the year 2014. The advertising
spending amount in this dataset is the total amount of ad spending in all channels: TV, magazines,
Internet, newspapers, radio, outdoor, etc.
The second dataset is scripted from Yelp.com and contains the corresponding Yelp reviews and
location information of those local restaurants in the first (advertising) dataset. I only took those
reviews posted before January 1st, 2014. Merging two datasets together, then we have the total
advertising spending amount and Yelp reviews of these local restaurants.
In this section, I first use a small dataset to graphically show the distribution of local restaurants’
advertising spending levels in the two dimensional space of their total number of reviews and
the ratio of good reviews. And in the second subsection, I use a large dataset with Regression
Discontinuity Design to find the relationship between advertising spending and average rating on
Yelp.
2.6.1 Graph Illustration
The graphical analysis in this section can be directly linked to the prediction of the model, and in
particular corresponds to the red-contoured area (with Searchers) in Figure 2.6.
The small dataset contains only the local restaurants that advertise in the New York City market,
one of the DMA (designated marketing area) regions, in Q1 of 2014. To repeat here, only the Yelp
reviews posted by Jan 1 of 2014 are collected for these local restaurants. Consumers in this region
share the same access for advertisements in all channels.
Filtering out restaurants that are not listed on Yelp, I have 553 local restaurants left in this
dataset. Summary statistics are provided in Table 2.4.
To match with the simplifying setting of my model, I take the four-star and five-star reviews
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics for The Graphical Analysis Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Good reviews (4/5 stars) 35.84991 85.78242
All reviews 57.7613 122.1084
Advertising spending (000) 5.622604 11.34311
Notes. Observations: 553
Figure 2.8: The Advertising Pattern of Local Restaurants in Neighborhoods with Only Two Restau-
rants (that are both in Kantar Media Database and on Yelp.com)
to be the good reviews (L). Consumers who give four stars or five stars to a local restaurant are
highly likely to come back and purchase again.13 Therefore, I approximate a local restaurant’s
loyal customer base by the group of consumers who rated this restaurant four or five stars.
I use contour plots to visualize the advertising pattern of restaurants with different levels of
good reviews (L) and all reviews (T ). I divide the dataset into several subsets and plot the ad-
vertising pattern for each subset. Each subset contains restaurants that have the same number of
opponents in its neighborhood.14 That is, restaurants that are the only restaurant in its neighborhood
belong to one subset, restaurants that locate in the neighborhoods with only two local restaurants
are in another subset, and so on.15
Using loyal customer base (i.e., L in the model) as the vertical axis, and total number of reviews
13See an evidence for this from the word clouds of Yelp reviews analyzed by Max Woolf at
http://minimaxir.com/2014/09/one-star-five-stars/.
14This neighborhood concept is defined by the “city” information of restaurants on Yelp pages.
15Note that, here I am not saying that these neighborhoods really have only one or two local restaurants, but that they
only have one or two local restaurants that are both advertising in the New York market and are listed on Yelp.
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Figure 2.9: The Advertising Pattern of Local Restaurants in New York City
(T ) as the horizontal axis, Figure 2.8 shows the advertising spending levels of the 90 restaurants
that are in neighborhoods with only two restaurants, and different colors indicate different levels.
From this graph, restaurants with a very high ratio of good reviews (or loyal customers) generally
have very high level of advertising spending. In the middle range (around the 45 degree line),
advertising spending levels are mixed: some restaurants advertise a lot while some others advertise
a little. Then for restaurants with a very low ratio of good reviews, their advertising spending level
is really low.
A more extreme subset is the one that contains the local restaurants located in the neighborhood
of New York City, and there are in total 107 restaurants in this subset. The contour plot is shown
in Figure 2.9. We can again see a similar pattern.
From the contour plots of advertising spending levels for local restaurants, we can see that firms
with a high ratio of good reviews are indeed more likely to be dominant in advertising. Next, I will
provide supporting evidence from regression analysis as well.
2.6.2 Regression Analysis
To do regression analysis, I use a larger dataset that contains all US local restaurants that advertised
in 2014 and are listed on Yelp. To be specific, this dataset is merged from an advertising dataset
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics for The Regression Anslysis Dataset
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Percentage of one-star reviews 9.9% 11.3%
Percentage of two-star reviews 11.6% 10.3%
Percentage of three-star reviews 17.2% 12%
Percentage of four-star reviews 33.1% 15%
Percentage of five-star reviews 28.1% 19.1%
Advertising spending ($ 000) 12.724 44.290
Notes. Observations: 13,360
with 13,360 local restaurants’ total advertising spending in 2014, and a Yelp information dataset
with reviews (by Jan 1, 2014) and other information of those local restaurants. Summary statistics
of this dataset is given in Table 2.5.
In the regression analysis, I regress with restaurants’ average rating instead of the ratio of 4- and
5-star reviews (i.e., the ratio of good reviews). This is because restaurants do not make decisions
based on the simplification concept “the ratio of good reviews” but rather on their average rating,
and average rating and the ratio of good reviews are not one-to-one corresponding to each other,
so running regression directly with the ratio of good reviews includes too much unnecessary noise.
More importantly, the ratio of good reviews exactly corresponds to the true average rating in the
theoretical model setting with only 1 and 0 reviews. Therefore, using data from a five-star review
system, we should regress with the true average rating.
To analyze the relationship between local restaurants’ advertising spending and their average
rating, I use the following specification:
Adi = α + β · Ri + γDR · dressyi + γDE · deliveri + γW · waitori + ΓP · Pi + εi (2.27)
where Ri is the average rating of a restaurant, dressyi is an indicator variable that equals to 1 if
the dressing code is “Dressy”, deliveri is an indicator variable that equals 1 if delivery is available,
waitori is an indicator variable of the availability of waiter service, and Pi consists of three price
dummy variables indicating the price level ($$, $$$, or $$$$).
If we simply run such a regression with all restaurants, we will get a regression result indicating
a negative relationship between restaurants’ average rating and advertising spending amount. See
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Figure 2.10: The Relationship between Ad Spending and True Rating without Recognition of RD
Drops
column (1) in Table 2.6. The estimated coefficient of variable Ri is significantly negative (-0.807).
However, this regression is incorrect since there is a complication caused by the discrepancy be-
tween the display rating and the true rating of a restaurant on Yelp. It is out of the scope of the
current paper to go into all the details, so I will use some graphs to briefly show the effect on ad-
vertising caused by such discrepancy. More detailed discussion can found in another paper of mine
that investigates the effect of a higher display rating on restaurants’ advertising spending using a
Regression Discontinuity design.
According to the empirical findings from the empirical RDD paper, there exist significant drops
in advertising spending when the true average rating crosses the thresholds of 3.25, 3.75 and 4.25.
That is, for relatively higher-rated restaurants, a higher display rating induces drops in advertising
spending of local restaurants. This effect of display rating needs to be separated from the effect of
true rating in order for us to learn the real relationship between a local restaurant’s (true) average
rating and its advertising spending.
Figure 2.10 is a binned scatterplot of advertising spending for restaurants with different true
average ratings. Each dot represents the average level of advertising spending of the restaurants
within that bin.16 We can see that, when the average rating goes above 3, advertising spending
16Each bin contains about 130 restaurants.
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Figure 2.11: The Relationship between Ad Spending and True Rating with Recognition of RD
Drops
decreases with the average rating, and this seems consistent with the traditional conclusions in the
literature of product reviews. However, once we look in detail at the plot with the recognition of
the effects of display rating (i.e., the drops at RD thresholds), we can see from Figure 2.11 that
the downward trend is entirely caused by the drops at the RD thresholds (where the display rating
jumps by 0.5 star), and in each interval between two thresholds advertising spending in fact goes
up with the average rating. This can be seen more clearly from the pooled RD regression results as
shown in Table 2.6.
Column (2) in Table 2.6 provides the estimates of the relationship between advertising spending
and average rating to the left and to the right of the RD thresholds, where the display ratings are
constant. I pool all RD thresholds together and assign a dummy for each interval (that contains a
threshold and has length 0.5). The average rating of each observation is normalized by its nearest
threshold.
We can see directly from the estimates in column (2) that the relationship between advertising
spending and average rating is significantly positive (2.811) to the left of the thresholds. I also test
for the significance of the slope to the right of the thresholds, and find that it is significantly positive
at 87% confidence level.17
17The two-tail p value is 26%. Because the point estimate is positive (2.811 - 0.954 = 1.957), therefore we can reject
against the hypothesis that it is positive at 87% confidence level.
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Table 2.6: RD: Pooled Regression
(1) (2)
Average rating −0.807
(0.150)
∗∗∗ 2.811
(1.551)
∗
Above threshold −1.085
(0.351)
∗∗∗
Average rating × Above threshold −0.854
(2.349)
Rating [1.5, 2) 2.965
(2.240)
Rating [2, 2.5) 1.299
(1.930)
Rating [2.5, 3) 1.922
(1.890)
Rating [3, 3.5) 1.446
(1.876)
Rating [3.5, 4) 1.201
(1.875)
Rating [4, 4.5) 0.295
(1.877)
Rating [4.5, 5] −0.187
(1.907)
Dressy 0.819
(0.454)
∗ 0.838
(0.454)
∗
Waiter service −0.920
(0.301)
∗∗∗ −0.931
(0.301)
∗∗∗
Delivery −0.505
(0.236)
∗∗ −0.511
(0.236)
∗∗
Reservation 0.195
(0.213)
0.176
(0.213)
Price level $$ 0.466
(0.262)
∗ 0.384
(0.262)
Price level $$$ 1.437
(0.424)
∗∗∗ 1.337
(0.424)
∗∗∗
Price level $$$$ 0.353
(0.898)
0.311
(0.898)
Constant 9.287
(0.631)
∗∗∗ 6.018
(1.909)
∗∗∗
Observations 10197 10197
Notes. The dependent variable in both specifications is the total
amount of advertising spending (unit: USD Thousands). Aver-
age rating is normalized by the nearest threshold. Regress only
with observations that advertise in only one market, and out-
liers are ruled out. All RD jump thresholds of display rating are
pooled together, and interval dummies are used. Significance
levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
In summary, controlling for the disturbing effect of Yelp display ratings on advertising, there is
in fact a significantly positive relationship between advertising spending and the local restaurants’
average rating. Therefore, we have seen supporting empirical evidence for the model prediction:
Higher-rated restaurants advertise more.18
18It is out of the scope of the current paper to analyze the effect of Yelp display rating at each threshold, but graphs
showing better details about the drops at thresholds above 3 and below 3 are provided in Figure ?? and Figure ?? in
Appendix 3.
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2.7 Discussion: The Capacity Limit
We have seen from the empirical findings that advertising of local restaurants goes up with average
ratings away from RD thresholds (where the display rating is constant) and that advertising goes
down with display ratings above 3. The positive relationship between advertising and average
ratings is consistent with the theory prediction in this paper that better online reviews increase the
benefit of advertising and therefore complement advertising. However, the negative response in
advertising to display ratings above 3 seems surprising and counterintuitive because display rating
is also an information on reviews, only coarser than the information of average rating.
The essential difference between display rating and the average rating is the way of their in-
teraction with firm profits. Display ratings of restaurants are shown on the search results page if a
consumer search for nearby restaurants. See Figure 2.12. An increase (by 0.5 stars) in the display
rating of a restaurant will increase the click rates of this restaurant. In other words, the group size
of Searchers for a restaurant will increase every time the display rating jumps. On the other hand,
when average rating increases between two adjacent jump thresholds of display rating, the display
rating is constant, therefore even though the reviews become better (which is the reason of the in-
crease in average rating), the number of Searchers will not change because any change in reviews
other than the display rating is unobservable from the search results page. However, for the con-
sumers who have opened the Yelp page of a restaurant and see the reviews, the increase in average
rating is observable and will raise consumers’ belief about the quality. Apply the prediction of
the theory model in this paper, a higher average rating complement advertising by increasing the
benefit of advertising.
In short, a higher display rating increases a firm’s profit by raising the number of consumers,
i.e., this is a “volume increase” that leads to a higher profit; a higher average rating increases a
firm’s profit by raising consumers’ willingness to pay, i.e., this is a “margin increase” that leads to
a higher profit. Both ways work to increase a firm’s profit, but they have different interactions with
advertising. The benefit of advertising is the part of the profit that comes from the group “traditional
new consumers” who are attracted by advertisements. The margin increase will increase the firm’s
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Figure 2.12: An Example of Yelp Search Results Page
profit margin over every single consumer, including the ones that are attracted by advertisements,
i.e., the traditional new consumers. Therefore, the margin increase resulting from a higher average
rating will complement the benefit from advertising and make advertising more profitable, but the
volume increase resulting from a higher display rating has almost no interaction with advertising
and the benefit of advertising basically remains the same.
A key thing to notice is that a volume increase might be bound by the capacity limit of a local
business, but a margin increase will never be bound and is always “the more the better”.
Most local businesses have the concern of capacity limits. A local restaurant, a hair salon,
or a hotel, cannot accommodate an unlimited number of customers. In the rest of this section, I
use comparative statics of the Searchers model (presented in Subsection 5.2) to show the volume
increase and the margin increase in profit, and the effect of capacity limits on them.
A capacity limit is an upper bound on the total number of consumers that a restaurant can
accommodate. Let n¯k=A,B denote the capacity limits of Firm A and Firm B. The sum of loyal
customers, traditional new consumers and Searchers of a firm cannot exceed its capacity limit:
Lk + nk + sk ≤ n¯k.
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2.7.1 Without Capacity Limit
First, suppose there is no capacity limit, and a firm may accommodate as many customers as there
will be. Because Firm A and Firm B are symmetric, here I discuss only Firm A.
If Firm A’s average rating increases between two jump thresholds of display rating, namely
when the display rating remains constant while average rating increases, there is no change in s:
4s = 0, but only θ˜A increases. Firm A’s profit always increases with d = θ˜A − θ˜B, which in turn
increases with θ˜A. This increase in Firm A’s profit caused by a higher average rating is the “margin
increase”.
If Firm A’s average rating increases across a jump threshold of display rating and causes its
display rating on Yelp to jump by half a star, then besides the increase in average rating θ˜A, there
is also an increase in s: 4s > 0, more Searchers find Firm A. We can see from Table 2.3 that Firm
A’s profit always increase with s. This increase in profit caused by the jump in display rating is
the “volume increase”. At the same time, due to the increase in average rating θ˜A, there is also a
“margin increase”.
In terms of a firm’s total profit, we can see that an increase in average rating increases a firm’s
profit by a larger amount, i.e., margin increase + volume increase, if this increase goes across a
jump threshold of display rating and makes the display rating to increase by 0.5 stars. But if an
increase in the average rating happens between two jump thresholds of display rating, where the
display rating remains constant, the firm’s profit will increase by a smaller amount, i.e., margin
increase only.
A firm’s total profit increases more if its display rating increases together with its average
rating. To see the interaction between rating and advertising, however, we need to find the change
in the benefit and cost of advertising resulting from a change in rating. An increase in total profit
might come with a decrease in the benefit of advertising.
The cost of advertising is always c > 0.
When Firm A advertises and has advantage in price competition (i.e., Firm A has a higher
ratio of loyal customers), see Table 2.3, the benefit of advertising (denoted by R) for Firm A is
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RA(MB = 1) = (LA + n + s)(γB11 + d) − (LA + s)(γB01 + d) if Firm B advertises, and is RA(MB = 0) =
(LA + n + s)(γB10 + d) − (LA + s)(γB00 + d) if Firm B does not advertise.
If Firm A’s average rating, i.e., θ˜A, increases by  > 0 but its display rating remains the same,
and hold all else constant, the change in RA will come only from d = θ˜A − θ˜B. In particular, d
will increase by . The change in the benefit of advertising resulting from the change in Firm A’s
average rating is
4RA(MB = 1; d + ) = 4RA(MB = 0; d + ) = n (2.28)
Therefore a higher average rating unambiguously increases a firm’s benefit from advertising by
raising consumers’ willingness to pay: the profit margin on each traditional new consumer attracted
by advertisement increases by . The change in advertising benefit is also a margin increase and
matches the change in Firm A’s total profit when only the average rating goes up.
If Firm A’s average rating θ˜A increases by  > 0 and crosses a jump threshold of display rating,
i.e., its display rating jumps by 0.5 star, two things will be changing, d = θ˜A − θ˜B and s. The
change in d is again , and the change in s (4s > 0) is the number of extra Searchers that are
attracted by the jump in Firm A’s display rating. Let s′ = s + 4s, and recall that γB11 = L
B
LB+n+sB ,
γB01 =
max{LB,(LB+n)θ˜B}
LB+n+sB , and γ
B
10 = γ
B
00 =
LB
LB+sB .
19 The changes in Firm A’s benefit of advertising
resulting from the change in both average rating and display rating are
4RA(MB = 1; d + , s′ = s + 4s) = RA(MB = 1; d + , s′) − RA(MB = 1; d, s)
= n + 4s · L
B −max{LB, (LB + n)θ˜B}
LB + n + sB
(2.29)
and
4RA(MB = 0; d + , s′ = s + 4s) = RA(MB = 0; d + , s′) − RA(MB = 0; d, s)
= n (2.30)
19Note that here I use sB instead of s to denote the group of Searchers for Firm B and sB is held constant, because the
number of Searchers that can find Firm B will not be affected by a change in Firm A’s rating.
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First, note that 4RA(MB = 0; d + , s′ = s+4s) = 4RA(MB = 0; d + ), that is the increase in s does
not change Firm A’s benefit of advertising if Firm B does not advertise. If Firm B advertises, the
increase in s brings a new part in 4RA: 4s · LB−max{LB,(LB+n)θ˜B}LB+n+sB , which equals 0 if LB ≥ (LB + n)θ˜B
and is negative otherwise. If LB < (LB + n)θ˜B is satisfied, intuitively it means that the competitor
of Firm A has a very good rating (θ˜B) or the advertising is very effective in reaching and bringing
new consumers (n). In this case, 4s · LB−max{LB,(LB+n)θ˜B}LB+n+sB = 4s · L
B−(LB+n)θ˜B
LB+n+sB < 0, i.e., the increase in
s reduces the benefit of advertising.
The effect of 4s enters 4RA, i.e., 4s · LB−(LB+n)θ˜BLB+n+sB < 0, if either θ˜B or n is large. In this model, the
effectiveness of advertising (n) must be large enough for the costly advertising to be ever profitable,
and the group of Searchers (s) is assumed to have a nontrivial size to make a difference. And in the
real world, take Yelp as an example, a high enough θ˜B comes with a large sB, a restaurant with a
high rating will be found by a large number of Searchers. Therefore the magnitude of L
B−(LB+n)θ˜B
LB+n+sB
is very small. Rewrite (2.29) as n( + 4sn · L
B−(LB+n)θ˜B
LB+n+sB ). Therefore if 4s is less than or only slightly
larger than n, 4RA would still be positive and small. In case of 4s being very large and exceeding
n a lot, 4RA might become negative, but because both n and sB are nontrivial, the change in the
marginal benefit of advertising will be small.
We can see that, without capacity limit, if a jump in display rating comes with the increase in
average rating, the resulting increase in s (Searchers) increases Firm A’s total profits unambigu-
ously, but in most cases it has no effect on Firm A’s benefit of advertising (RA). In the case that 4s
does change RA, it reduces the margin increase  that comes with the higher average rating θ˜A. But
the reduction force from the jump in display rating is only of a small magnitude.
2.7.2 With Capacity Limit
Now I consider the case that only Firm A’s capacity limit becomes binding, i.e., LA + n + s = n¯A,
when Firm A advertises and wins the Searchers.
Firm A’s benefit of advertising when capacity limit is binding is RCLA (MB = 1; n¯A) = (LA +
n + s)(γB11 + d) − (LA + s)(γB01 + d) = n¯A(γB11 + d) − (LA + s)(γB01 + d) if Firm B advertises, and is
RCLA (MB = 0; n¯A) = (LA + n + s)(γB10 + d) − (LA + s)(γB00 + d) = n¯A(γB10 + d) − (LA + s)(γB00 + d) if
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Firm B does not advertise.
If Firm A’s average rating θ˜A increases by  between two jump thresholds of display rating, i.e.,
the display rating remains constant, then only d = θ˜A− θ˜B increases (by ) in RCLA . In particular, the
changes in Firm A’s advertising benefit when its average rating increases under a binding capacity
limit are
4RCLA (MB = 1; d + , n¯A) = 4RCLA (MB = 0; d + , n¯A) = n (2.31)
Therefore with capacity limit the change in advertising benefit is still a margin increase () that
raises Firm A’s profit margin from each traditional new consumer (n) attracted by Firm A’s ad-
vertisements. A higher average rating always increases a firm’s benefit and also its willingness to
advertising.
If Firm A’s average rating θ˜A increases by  > 0 and also crosses a jump threshold of display
rating, i.e., its display rating jumps by 0.5 star, again both d = θ˜A − θ˜B and s will be increasing. But
now with capacity limit, if s increases by 4s > 0, the number of traditional new consumers that
are attracted by advertisements and can be accommodated will change as well, and 4n = −4s to
make LA + n′ + s′ = n¯A still hold. So if Firm A’s display rating changes with its average rating, the
changes in Firm A’s benefit of advertising when capacity limit is binding are
4RCLA (MB = 1; d + , s′ = s + 4s, n¯A) = RCLA (MB = 1; d + , s′, n¯A) − RCLA (MB = 1; d, s, n¯A)
= n − 4s(γB01 + d + ) (2.32)
and
4RCLA (MB = 0; d + , s′ = s + 4s, n¯A) = RCLA (MB = 0; d + , s′, n¯A) − RCLA (MB = 0; d, s, n¯A)
= n − 4s(γB00 + d + ) (2.33)
We can see that, when capacity limit becomes binding, the jump in display rating (that leads to
4s > 0) that comes with the increase in average rating (4θ˜A = ) will always reduce the advertising
benefit. In particular, if 4s is big enough, the jump in display rating will overturn the margin
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increase caused by the higher average rating, and results in a margin decrease in advertising benefit
after the average rating has increased. For example, if 4s is close to the size of n, then 4RA(MB =
1) = −4s(γB01 + d) and 4RA(MB = 0) = −4s(γB00 + d). If 4s is larger than n, the margin decrease in
advertising benefit will be larger than 4sn (γ
B + d).20
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I use game theory and Bayesian learning to study how competing firms with different
customer reviews choose their advertising strategies, with and without Searchers. As an extension,
I also study how the availability of customer reviews changes the advertising strategies of the
incumbent and entrant firms in an entry game.
The key question that my paper answers is “Do online customer reviews complement or substi-
tute firms’ advertising?” In the literature of online customer reviews, good reviews and advertising
are often thought to be substitutes, since a high rating can improve the effectiveness of advertising
and can even directly substitute advertising when people can search for ratings. However, findings
from the RDD analysis (see Figure 2.11) show that local restaurants’ advertising spending goes up
with their average rating on Yelp, but drops with display ratings above 3. This opposite pattern in
advertising implies that online reviews are in fact complements to advertising, and display ratings
above 3 work as substitutes for advertising.
The RDD analysis enables us to distinguish between the effect of average rating and the effect
of display rating on advertising spending. It also provides an explanation of why we have been
seeing a negative correlation between rating and advertising spending in regressions all the time:
the display rating (above 3) has a strong negative effect and the downward trend comes entirely
from this negative effect of display rating. By controlling for the effect of display rating using
RDD, I find a significantly positive relationship between advertising and average rating, i.e., if
consumers consider only the average rating in their purchase decision, a higher rated firm will be
advertising more.
20Take (2.33) for example. Rewrite it as n[ − 4sn  − 4sn (γB00 + d)]. If 4s > n, then n[ − 4sn  − 4sn (γB00 + d)] < 0 and the
marginal benefit of advertising decreases by | − 4sn  − 4sn (γB00 + d)| = 4sn  −  + 4sn (γB00 + d) > 4sn (γB00 + d).
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The reason for display rating (above 3) to have a negative effect on advertising is the capacity
limits of local businesses. A higher display rating increases the click rates and, therefore, increases
the number of Searchers visiting the restaurant. However, when the display rating is high enough,
the capacity limit becomes binding and the increased Searchers will crowd out the benefit from
those new consumers that are attracted by advertising, thus the benefit of advertising starts to
decrease. Comparative statics of the theory model, presented in Section 7, show that the jump in
display rating cannot cause a significant change in advertising benefit if there is no capacity limit.
Applying the findings of this research to other industries with online reviews and capacity
limits, if the rounding algorithm is less discrete (for example, Expedia and Priceline use a rounding
algorithm to the nearest tenth), we would expect to see smaller drops and more increasing trend as
the average rating increases. The effect of jumps in display rating should be smaller if the rounding
algorithm rounds to the nearest tenth.
Another interesting prediction comes from the extension to an entry game. An incumbent firm
with a long history and a big loyal customer base is not necessarily intimidating. If the incumbent
does not have a high enough ratio of good reviews, i.e., the ratio of its loyal customers to all of
its previous buyers is not high enough, this big incumbent is weak in the competition with the
entrant, and therefore entry is profitable and cannot be deterred. Such incumbent is a “fat cat” as
in Fudenberg and Tirole [1984]. But the difference caused by the availability of customer reviews
is that a big incumbent with a high ratio of good reviews is very strong and is able to deter entry.
Such application in entry deterrence problem might be tested in future research.
In summary, the existence of customer reviews provides an effective information channel for
consumers to learn about firms’ qualities, so firms should evaluate the effect of their marketing
strategies in this new environment, and adjust their marketing strategies accordingly. We have seen
that the availability of customer reviews brings big changes to the traditional predictions on firms’
advertising strategies. A lot of other traditional topics about firms can be revised in the “Age of the
Internet”, and we might get many interesting new results.
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2.9 Appendix
2.9.1 Equilibrium Analysis for The Asymmetric Previous Buyers Cases
Since Firm A and Firm B are symmetric, here I only study the case T A > T B > 0. The three
conditions characterizing the equilibrium for this case are shown in Figure 2.13. We can see they
are essentially the same as the symmetric case (T A = T B = T ) in the main model, a firm needs to
have a high enough ratio of good reviews to be the dominant firm in advertising. What is different
here is that, when Firm A has more previous buyers than Firm B, it is harder for Firm A to reach
the “high enough ratio” of good reviews.
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Figure 2.13: Three Conditions for Case T A > T B > 0
2.9.2 The Yelp Web Page of A Restaurant: Average Rating and Display Rating
See Figure 2.14. When consumers open the web page of a restaurant on Yelp.com, they directly
see the display rating: the colored stars (4 stars here) displayed right below the restaurant name. If
they click on the button “Details” beside the display star rating, they can see the full distribution
of reviews. The display rating rounds the average rating calculated from the distribution to the
nearest half star. The distribution of reviews allow consumers to visually approximate and compare
between restaurants with the same display star rating.
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Figure 2.14: The Display Rating and Distribution of Reviews of a Restaurant
2.9.3 RD Graphs Showing The Effects of Yelp Display Rating on The Advertising Spending
In Figure 2.15, the top panel shows the drops at the thresholds above 3, including thresholds 3.25,
3.75, 4.25 and 4.75; the bottom panel shows the insignificant drops at the thresholds below 3,
including thresholds 1.25, 1.75, 2.25 and 2.75. Empirical estimates show that there are insignificant
drops at the thresholds below 3 with precise estimates.
Figure 2.15: Advertising Spending by Local Restaurants’ Average Rating around Thresholds
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2.9.4 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. (No pure strategy equilibrium)
Proof. The best responses of two firms are shown in Figure 2.16. There are no intersection of two
firms’ best response functions, hence no pure strategy equilibrium in the Bertrand game.
pB
pA
d
1
1
γA − d γB θ˜B
γA
γB + d
θ˜A
Red: Firm A’s best response function; Blue: Firm B’s best response function.
This case shown in the graph is when Firm A has more loyal customers: LA > LB, i.e. d = θ˜A − θ˜B > 0.
Figure 2.16: Best Responses in the Pricing Subgame

Proof of Proposition 1. (The mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing subgame)
Proof. It has been shown that the pricing subgame has no pure strategy equilibrium. Here I show
how to construct the mixed strategy equilibrium for the case where firm A has advantage, and the
analysis when firm B has advantage is the same.
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, both firms mix over a range of prices. We know that a firm
would never charge a price below its reservation price γk, so the prices that firm k mixes must be
above γk. Also, it is not optimal for a firm to charge a price higher than 1, since no consumer would
purchase at that price.
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Here I give the proof only for the case where firm A has advantage, i.e. γA < γB + d. The proof
for the case of firm B having advantage is the same.
If firm A has advantage in price competition, by charging a price of γB+d, firm A can force firm
B out of the competition. Therefore, the highest profit that firm A could secure is (LA + n)(γB + d),
which is higher than LA since γA < γB + d; the highest profit that firm B could secure is LB. In the
mixed strategy equilibrium, firms get an expected profit equal to their highest secured profit. Let
FA(p) and FB(p) denote two firms’ equilibrium mixed strategies, then we have
LA pA + [1 − FB(pA − d)]npA = (LA + n)(γB + d) γB + d ≤ pA ≤ 1 (2.34)
LB pB + [1 − FA(pB + d)]npB = LB γB ≤ pB ≤ 1 (2.35)
Note that firm A does not mix below γB + d (> γA) as firm B will never choose prices below γB,
and pA = γB + d is already enough to beat the lowest price of firm B.
We can therefore calculate each firm’s mixed strategy distribution function from (2.34) and
(2.35):
Before calculate for the distributions of all mixed prices, let us look at the special interval
(θ˜k, 1]. For pA > θ˜A, no new consumers purchase product A (even if pA < pB + d), so we have
1 − FB(pA − d) = 0 for pA > θ˜A (or pA − d > θ˜B). Therefore, FB(p) = 1 for p > θ˜B, which means
FB has no mass point at 1, nor at any price between θ˜B and 1. Similarly, 1 − FA(pB + d) = 0 for
pB > θ˜B (or pB + d > θ˜B + d = θ˜A). So FA(p) = 1 for p > θ˜A, FA has no mass point at 1 (or any
other price above θ˜A) either.
Then we get the distribution functions (FA and FB) in the mixed strategy equilibrium as follows.
FA(p) =

0 p ≤ γB + d
1 − LBn(p−d) + L
B
n γ
B + d ≤ p ≤ θ˜A
1 p ≥ θ˜A
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and
FB(p) =

0 p ≤ γB
1 − (LA+n)(γB+d)n(p+d) + L
A
n γ
B ≤ p ≤ θ˜B
1 p ≥ θ˜B
FA first order stochastically dominates FB. See Figure 2.17.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Printed by Wolfram Mathematica Student Edition
Firm A
Firm B
p!_B !_B + d "_A"_B
Figure 2.17: The distributions of firms’ pricing strategies in the pricing subgame
Each firm has a mass point. Denote the probability at mass points by m(A) and m(B). For firm
A, there is a mass point at θ˜A, and m(A) = 1 − FA(θ˜A) = LBn ( 1θ˜B − 1) > 0.21 For firm B, the mass
point is θ˜B, and m(B) = 1 − FB(θ˜B) = (L
A+n)(γB+d)
nθ˜A
− LAn . Recall that this equilibrium is under the
case where γB + d > γA, so we have m(B) > (L
A+n)γA
nθ˜A
− LAn = L
A
nθ˜A
− LAn > 0.
Next I give an intuitive proof of the uniqueness of this mixed strategy equilibrium (FA, FB).
Suppose there exists another mixed strategy equilibrium (F′A, F
′
B), Firm B must get a higher
expected profit than in the above equilibrium. This is because that Firm B does not accept any
expected profit lower than LB2 , which equals its secured profit. If Firm B’s expected profit remains
the same, the equilibrium (F′A, F
′
B) will be the same as the above one.
If Firm B gets a higher expected profit than LB, the distribution F′B must shift probabilities to
higher prices than FB. Then Firm A can undercut by shifting probabilities to prices just below
Firm B’s, and extract all the increased profits of Firm B. Therefore, Firm B cannot get any higher
expected profit than LB in the mixed strategy equilibrium, and (FA, FB) is the unique mixed strategy
21According to the assumption of Beta-distributed beliefs, the mean θ˜k = 1+L
k
2+T k is always strictly less than 1.
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equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 2. (Condition of Uniqueness)
Proof. When both Firm A and Firm B satisfy PE, and Firm A has advantage in price competition
against Firm B, the stage game is given in Table 2.2.
When (LA + n)(γB + d)−c ≥ LA is satisfied, advertising is a dominant strategy for Firm A. Firm
B chooses not to advertise whenever Firm A advertises. Therefore, the unique equilibrium is that
only Firm A advertises.
If (LA + n)(γB + d) − c < LA, both firms only advertise when the rival does not. Therefore,
there are three equilibria, which are, only Firm A advertises, only Firm B advertises, and each firm
randomizes advertising with a probability (λA, λB).
λA and λB are such that [(LA + n)(γB + d) − c]λB + [(LA + n)θ˜A − c](1 − λB) = LA, and
(LB − c)λA + [(LB + n)θ˜B − c](1 − λA) = LB. 
Proof of Proposition 3: (Non-empty set of multiple equilibria)
Proof. Here I only prove U − A⇒ APC − A, and it is similar for U − B⇒ APC − B.
The condition U − A is (LA + n)(γB + d) − c > LA.
⇒ (LA + n)( LBLB+n + θ˜A − θ˜B) > LA
⇒ γA − θ˜A < γB − θ˜B, which is the condition APC − A
As long as c > 0, there always exist LA and LB such that (LA + n)(γB + d) > LA > (LA + n)(γB +
d)− c, which means that Firm A satisfies APC−A, i.e. γA < γB + d, but Uniqueness condition does
not hold.
Therefore, the set {U − A} is a strict subset of {APC − A}. 
Proof of Lemma 2. (A new firm always has advantage in price competition against an estab-
lished firm.)
Proof. WLOG, here I prove for the case that Firm A is the established firm, or the incumbent.
Consider the pricing subgame after both firms advertise.
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Firm B has advantage in price competition if and only if γB + d < γA.
We have γB = 0, d = 1+L
A
2+T − 12 , and γA = L
A
LA+n .
Compare LHS = 1+L
A
2+T − 12 and RHS = L
A
LA+n . Note that T ≥ n.
At end points, LA = 0 and LA = T , we have LHS < RHS .
Both LHS and RHS are monotonically increasing: ∂LHS
∂LA > 0,
∂RHS
∂LA > 0.
Therefore, for all values of LA, we have LHS < RHS . 
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Chapter 3
Delay in Platform Adoption: A Dynamic Adoption Model (with Marc Rysman)
This paper proposes a new explanation for adoption failure or delay in markets with network ef-
fects. In the model, consumers and software providers play a dynamic adoption game. Each group
of players choose between two incompatible technologies. Consumers may wait, but firms may
not. Although efficiency requires one technology to be adopted by all consumers and firms right
away, there is a “market split and adoption delay” equilibrium. In this equilibrium some consumers
choose to wait at first and firms split between the two technologies. The model is motivated by the
56K modem market, in which competition between two technologies appears to have led to adop-
tion failure, until an industry standard setting organization coordinated the market on an alternative
standard.
3.1 Introduction
In a classic two-sided platform or technology adoption problem in markets with network effects,
consumers and firms need to adopt one of two (incompatible) platforms or technologies. In the
literature, most papers study the adoption game in a static setting and each player has to make her
adoption decision right away given the available information on two platforms. However, no study
has been done to allow players to “delay” their adoption.
This paper is based on the model used in Church and Gandal [1992]. We extend Church and
Gandal’s static adoption game to a dynamic version which has two periods. Consumers may wait
and delay their adoption decision, while firms may not and have to choose a platform (technology)
to operate with. The dynamic setting and the freedom to “delay” brings significant difference in
the results.
Consider a market with two incompatible technology platforms. To use the product, consumers
need to purchase a hardware with one of the two technologies and then purchase softwares from
firms. Each firm has to choose one and only one platform to provide its software product.
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Consumers enjoy higher utility from a larger variety and a lower price of software products.
So consumers in general would like to adopt a platform with a larger number of firms, and this
is the network effect of consumers. Firms, however, do not always benefit from adopting a bigger
platform. As the number of firms increases on a platform, there will be more consumers adopting
this platform, firms will get higher profits, this is the network effect of firms. But at the same
time, as the number of firms increases, the competition becomes more intense and the price will
be lower, profit then decreases, and this is the competition effect of firms. Therefore, firms do not
always adopt the bigger platform.
We show that, in the parameter space that only has standardization equilibrium (i.e. all firms
and consumers adopt one platform) in Church and Gandal [1992], if we have two periods instead,
there exist a “market split and adoption delay” equilibrium where, in period 1, some consumers
choose to adopt A and the same number of consumers adopt B, the rest of the consumers choose
to wait, and the period-1 firms split equally between two platforms, then in period 2, there are two
possible equilibria, either all waiting consumers and most period-2 firms adopt A (i.e., platform A
becomes the dominant platform), or all waiting consumers and most period-2 firms adopt B (i.e.,
platform B becomes dominant).
When standardization equilibrium happens, it means that the network effect of firms dominate
the competition effect. After we add a second period, the “market split and adoption delay” equi-
librium exists because, when certain conditions hold, the dynamic competition effect dominates the
dynamic network effect.
Consumers are differentiated in their intrinsic preferences for two platforms. The consumers
who have strong preferences toward a platform are more likely to adopt right away (in the first
period), and the consumers who are more indifferent between two platforms are more likely to wait
and adopt in the second period after the dominant platform reveals.
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3.2 Literature Review
There is a huge literature on technology adoption. Consumers or firms choose between two avail-
able technologies, i.e., one-sided adoption, or both consumers and firms choose between two tech-
nologies, i.e., two-sided adoption. An important feature of most papers on technology adoption is
network effect. (See the handbook by Farrell and Klemperer [2007] for a summary on competition
with network effects.) There are two types of network effects, direct network effect and indirect
network effect.
Direct network effect (also called the bandwagon effect) describes the situation when the size
of peer users (network size) enters directly into the utility function of each user, i.e., there exists
network externality of adoption. Papers with direct network effects include but are not limited to:
Katz and Shapiro [1985], Farrell and Saloner [1986], Arthur [1989], Bassanini and Dosi [1999],
Ellison and Fudenberg [2003], among which Arthur [1989] and Bassanini and Dosi [1999] study
competing technology dynamics with one-sided adoption model.
Indirect network effect does not have the network size in users’ utility function, but the network
size affects the factors in the utility function and indirectly improves utility. As Chou and Shy
[1990] show, assuming increasing returns to scale and that consumers prefer the variety of products
are sufficient for the existence of (indirect) network effect. Chou and Shy [1990] and Church and
Gandal [1992] study a one-period two-sided adoption model with indirect network effects, and
Jeffrey et al. [2008] study a one-period one-sided adoption model with indirect network effects.
This paper falls into the class of indirect network effect models, and in particular is based on the
model used in Church and Gandal [1992]. What we add to the literature are: 1) we study two-sided
adoption with indirect network effects in a dynamic setting; and 2) consumers’ choice set extends
from {A, B} to {A, B,wait} in the first period. With these new features, we are able to find a new type
of equilibrium, which we call “market split and adoption delay” equilibrium where standardization
does not happen because of the dynamics, some consumers choose to wait until period 2 to adopt,
and in the end both platforms are viable with nonzero consumers and firms.
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3.3 Setting
The consumer preferences are the same as in Church and Gandal [1992], i.e. modeled by the CES
utility function.
U(x1, x2, ..., xN) = (
∑
i
x1/βi )
β + φ, 1 < β ≤ 2 (3.1)
where xi is the consumed amount of software good i, N is the number of software products.
There are two platforms, A and B. To use the softwares, a consumer has to purchase a unit
of hardware for one platform. The hardware product itself does not provide benefit in consumer
utility, it only grants access to the software products on the same platform. Assume that the two
platforms are incompatible: softwares for platform A cannot be used on a hardware of platform B,
and vice versa.
There are a continuum of consumers. Same as Church and Gandal, we use a linear Hoteling
model to represent consumers’ preferences for two platforms. Assume that these consumers are
distributed uniformly over a unit interval, m ∈ [0, 1], according to their tastes for two platforms.
Platform A locates at 0, and B locates at 1. The utility of consumer of type m from products on a
platform (h = A, B) is:
Uh(x1, x2, ..., xN ,m) = (
∑
i
x1/βi )
β + φ − km, 1 < β ≤ 2 (3.2)
where k is a measure of the degree of differentiation between platforms.
The representative consumer has a total income y to spend on the hardware and software prod-
ucts. Let ph denote the unit price of hardware product for platform h. After adopting a platform,
type m consumer maximizes her utility Uh(x1, x2, ..., xN ,m) under the budget constraint
∑
i
ρixi = y − ph (3.3)
where ρi is the unit price of software product i (on platform h).
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The indirect utility of consumer locating a distance m away from platform h is therefore
V(qh, ph,N,m) = (y − ph)/qh + φ − km (3.4)
where qh is the aggregate price of softwares for platform h. When all software providers charge the
same price ρ, we have
qh = ρN(1−β) (3.5)
Therefore, the indirect utility from platform h that locates a distance of m away is now:
V(ρ, ph,N,m) = Nβ−1(y − ph)/ρ + φ − km (3.6)
As in Church and Gandal [1992], the hardware technologies are non-proprietary, and therefore
are sold at the hardware marginal cost c, i.e. ph = c. The software products share the same constant
marginal cost s and the same fixed cost F. In the equilibrium of the monopolistic competition
between software firms, the unit price of software is ρ = βs. So consumers’ indirect utility from
platform h is further simplified to
V(ρ = βs, ph = c,N,m) =
Nβ−1(y − c)
βs
+ φ − km (3.7)
3.4 The Adoption Game
3.4.1 Timing
The adoption game has two periods, a set of new firms enter in each period but there are no new
consumers. There are two stages in each period, firm adoption stage and consumer adoption stage.
The timing of the two-period game is:
Period 1
• Firm Adoption: There are n software firms enter the industry, and each firm needs to choose
a platform (A or B) to provide product for. (Let NA1 denote the number of firms that adopt
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platform A, and NB1 denote firms that adopt platform B, then N
A
1 + N
B
1 = n.)
• Consumer Adoption: After software firms adopt platform and start providing software prod-
ucts, consumers choose between two platforms, or choose to wait. (Let mA1 and m
B
1 denote
the measure of consumers that adopt A and B respectively, and 1−mA1 −mB1 is the number of
consumers that choose to wait.)
Period 2
• Firm Adoption: Network sizes of two platforms (i.e. NA1 ,mA1 and NB1 ,mB1 ) are observable
to all. There are another n new firms enter the industry, and these new firms also choose
between platforms A and B. (Let NA2 and N
B
2 denote firms that adopt A and B respectively,
and NA2 + N
B
2 = n.)
• Consumer Adoption: Consumers who have adopted a platform in period 1 simply continue
purchasing from all software firms on the same platform. All waiting consumers choose
between two platforms and purchase both hardware and software products. (Let m∗ denote
all the consumers that have adopted A by the end of period 2, and 1 − m∗ consumers have
adopted B by the end of period 2.)
We solve for the SPNE (Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium) of this two-period game by backward
induction. An equilibrium is described by the adoption decisions by firms entering in period 1
(NA1 ,N
B
1 ), by firms entering in period 2 (N
A
2 ,N
B
2 ), and by consumers in two periods (m
A
1 ,m
B
1 ,m
∗).
In Church and Gandal [1992], when the total number of entrant firms (N) exceeds a certain
level, i.e.
Nβ−1 > 2β−1kβs/[2(β − 1)(y − c)] (3.8)
, only standardization equilibria exist.1 That is, if (3.8) is true, the only equilibria are that, either
all firms and all consumers adopt A, or all firms and consumers adopt B in the equilibrium. In our
1See Proposition 2 (case 2) in Church and Gandal (1992).
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paper, we focus on the subset of parameter space where
(2n)β−1 > 2β−1kβs/[2(β − 1)(y − c)] (3.9)
, where n is the number of entrant firms in each period.
We will show the significant effect of dynamic tradeoffs on firms’ and consumers’ adoption
strategies by proving the existence of a new type of equilibrium where standardization does not
happen.
3.4.2 Period 2
Adoption decisions from period 1 are observable in period 2. There have been mA1 consumers
adopted A, mB1 consumers adopted B, and 1−mA1 −mB1 consumers waiting. Firms are not allowed to
wait, and it is now observable that NA1 firms adopted A and N
B
1 = n − NA1 firms adopted B in period
1.
Consumers won’t choose to wait again in period 2 since the game ends in period 2. The
marginal consumer m∗ is indifferent between adopting A and adopting B:
V(ρ = βs, pA = c,NA1 + N
A
2 ,m
∗) = V(ρ = βs, pB = c,NB1 + N
B
2 , 1 − m∗) (3.10)
Then the marginal consumer m∗ as a function of NA1 + N
A
2 can be expressed as
m∗(NA1 ,N
A
2 ) =
(NA1 + N
A
2 )
β−1(y − c) − (2n − NA1 − NA2 )β−1(y − c) + kβs
2kβs
(3.11)
In period 2, NA1 is already given and fixed, therefore m
∗ changes with NA2 , i.e. how firms in period
2 allocate between two platforms. We can see that m∗ changes monotonically with NA2 :
dm∗
dNA2
=
(β − 1)(NA1 + NA2 )β−2(y − c) + (β − 1)(2n − NA1 − NA2 )β−2(y − c)
2kβs
> 0 (3.12)
The more firms adopt A in period 2, the more waiting consumers will adopt A.
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However, different from a static adoption model, m∗ will not change freely from 0 to 1 as NA2
varies, there are upper and lower bounds to the range of m∗: mA1 ≤ m∗ ≤ 1 − mB1 . Therefore,
by (3.12), we know that there will be two thresholds of NA2 , say N
∗
2 and N
∗∗
2 , such that when N
A
2
exceeds N∗∗2 , m
∗ will always equal to 1 − mB1 , and when NA2 ≤ N∗2 , m∗ will equal to mA1 . The
bounds of m∗ are exactly the important changes that lead to our different equilibrium result, and
this importance will be illustrated later by graphs.
Knowing the waiting consumers’ adoption strategies, described by m∗(NA1 ,N
A
2 ), firms’ profits
of adopting each platform are:
piA2 [m
∗(NA1 ,N
A
2 ), pA = c,N
A
1 + N
A
2 ] =
(β − 1)m∗(NA1 ,NA2 )(y − c)
β(NA1 + N
A
2 )
− F (3.13)
piB2 [m
∗(NA1 ,N
A
2 ), pB = c,N
B
1 + N
B
2 ] =
(β − 1)(1 − m∗(NA1 ,NA2 ))(y − c)
β(NB1 + N
B
2 )
− F
=
(β − 1)(1 − m∗(NA1 ,NA2 ))(y − c)
β(2n − NA1 − NA2 )
− F (3.14)
Substituting (3.11) in here, piA2 and pi
B
2 are then both functions of N
A
2 .
If there are no boundaries of m∗ as in a static setting, or equivalently mA1 = m
B
1 = 0, the profit
functions are similar to those in Church and Gandal (1992), and will only generate standardization
equilibria in the parameter space (3.9) that we chose. This can be shown in a few simple steps.
Within this parameter space (3.9), piA2 and pi
B
2 are monotone functions of N
A
2 , and will intersect for
once and only once. This intersection point is NA2 = n − NA1 . See Figure 3.1, since piA2 is increasing
in NA2 and pi
B
2 is decreasing in N
B
2 , the intersection point N
A
2 = n − NA1 is not an equilibrium, and
there will be no equilibrium at any point except the two ends of the range of NA2 , i.e. N
A
2 = 0 and
NA2 = n.
However, if at least one of mA1 and m
B
1 is nonzero, firms’ profit function would look a lot
different. For values of NA2 above N
∗∗
2 , the profit of adopting platform A is
piA2 [m
∗ = 1 − mB1 , pA = c,NA1 + NA2 ] =
(β − 1)(1 − mB1 )(y − c)
β(NA1 + N
A
2 )
− F
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Figure 3.1: Firms’ profit of adopting each platform when mA1 = m
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Figure 3.2: Case 1. 0 < mA1 < 1/2, 0 < m
B
1 < 1/2
which is decreasing in NA2 , and for values of N
A
2 below N
∗
2 , the profit of adopting A is
piA2 [m
∗ = mA1 , pA = c,N
A
1 + N
A
2 ] =
(β − 1)mA1 (y − c)
β(NA1 + N
A
2 )
− F
which is also decreasing in NA2 . Depending on the values of m
A
1 and m
B
1 , there can be three cases.
Case 1. 0 < mA1 < 1/2, 0 < m
B
1 < 1/2. See Figure 3.2. There are two possible equilibria: left
intersection – all waiting consumers adopt B, m∗ = mA1 ,N
A
2 = 2nm
A
1 − NA1 , and right intersection–
all waiting consumers adopt A m∗ = 1−mB1 ,NA2 = 2n(1−mB1 )−NA1 . The right intersection is within
the range of NA2 , [0, n], if N
A
1 > n(1 − 2mB1 ). And if NA1 ≤ n(1 − 2mB1 ) is true, there is not much
difference in the result, and the right-hand equilibrium will simply be NA2 = n,m
∗ = 1 − mB1 .
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Figure 3.3: Case 2. mA1 > 1/2, 0 < m
B
1 < 1/2
If less than N∗ period-2 firms adopt platform A (i.e., NA2 ≤ N∗), platform B becomes the
dominant platform and all waiting consumers will adopt B. The consumer network size of platform
A will then become constant at mA1 as N
A
2 continues to decrease below N
∗. Therefore, as NA2
decreases below N∗, the network effect is fixed and the competition effect becomes smaller (less
firms are competing on platform A), and we can see the profit of adopting platform A increases as
NA2 decreases. If N
A
2 ≥ N∗∗, all waiting consumers will adopt platform A which is the dominant
platform. As NA2 increases above N
∗∗, the consumer network size is fixed at mB1 so the network
effect is fixed, and the competition effect increases on platform A, therefore, the profit of adopting
A decreases as NA2 increases.
Similarly for the profit from adopting platform B: When NA2 decreases below N
∗, the network
effect is fixed and the competition effect on platform B increases (more firms adopt B), so the profit
from adopting B decreases as NA2 decreases. When N
A
2 increases above N
∗∗, the network effect is
again fixed and the competition effect on platform B decreases (less firms adopt B), therefore, the
profit from adopting B increases as NA2 increases.
Case 2. mA1 > 1/2, 0 < m
B
1 < 1/2. See Figure 3.3. There is only one equilibrium: all waiting
consumers adopt A, m∗ = 1 − mB1 ,NA2 = 2n(1 − mB1 ) − NA1 . Again, the intersection will be smaller
than n if NA1 > n(1 − 2mB1 ), and if not, the equilibrium will be m∗ = 1 − mB1 ,NA2 = n.
The shapes of period-2 firms’ profits and the intuitions are in general similar to those in case
83
5 10 15 20 25
N2A
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
period 2 profit
A
B
N*
N**
Figure 3.4: Case 3. 0 < mA1 < 1/2,m
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1. The difference here is that, when there have already been a large number of consumers adopting
platform A in period 1, the period-2 firms that adopt A will enjoy a larger network effect compared
to those adopting B. But because the competition effect quickly increases as the network effect
becomes fixed, as long as NA1 > n(1 − 2mB1 ), there will still be some period-2 firms adopting
platform B to enjoy the lesser competition on the smaller platform.
If more than half consumers adopt platform A in period 1, then everyone can predict that the
dominant platform will be A.
Case 3. 0 < mA1 < 1/2,m
B
1 > 1/2. See Figure 3.4. There is only one equilibrium: all waiting
consumers adopt B, m∗ = mA1 ,N
A
2 = 2nm
A
1 − NA1 . If NA1 > 2nmA1 , there will be no period-2 firms
adopting A (NA2 = 0).
This case is symmetric to case 2: If more than half consumers adopt platform B in period 1,
then it is certain that the dominant platform will be B.
3.4.3 Period 1
Consider case 1 (0 < mA1 < 1/2, 0 < m
B
1 < 1/2), which has two equilibria in period 2. Because
firms get the same profit at both equilibria and everything is symmetric, each of the two possible
equilibria in case 1 happens with probability 1/2. Back at period 1, in any equilibrium with consis-
tent beliefs, consumers and firms will have the same belif that the two equilibria in case 1 each has
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probability 1/2. For ease of notation, denote the left-hand equilibrium with /, and the right-hand
equilibrium with ..
Consumers make adoption decisions in period 1, choosing between A, B and waiting. Let m
denote the location of a consumer on the unit interval, then VA(m) denote her total expected value
of adopting A, VB(m) her total expected value of adopting B, and V∅(m) denote her expected value
of waiting.
VA(m) = V(ρ = βs, pA = c,NA1 ,m) +
1
2
V(ρ = βs, pA = c,NA1 + N
A
2 ,m|/)
+
1
2
V(ρ = βs, pA = c,NA1 + N
A
2 ,m|.)
=
(y − c)(NA1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − km + 1
2
[
(y − c)(2nmA1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − km]
+
1
2
[
(y − c)(2n − 2nmB1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − km] (3.15)
VB(m) = V(ρ = βs, pB = c, n − NA1 , 1 − m) +
1
2
V(ρ = βs, pB = c, 2n − NA1 − NA2 , 1 − m|/)
+
1
2
V(ρ = βs, pB = c, 2n − NA1 − NA2 , 1 − m|.)
=
(y − c)(NB1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − k(1 − m) + 1
2
[
(y − c)(2n − 2nmA1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − k(1 − m)]
+
1
2
[
(y − c)(2nmB1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − k(1 − m)] (3.16)
V∅(m) =
1
2
V(ρ = βs, pB = c, 2n − NA1 − NA2 , 1 − m|/) +
1
2
V(ρ = βs, pA = c,NA1 + N
A
2 ,m|.)
=
1
2
[
(y − c)(2n − 2nmA1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − k(1 − m)] + 1
2
[
(y − c)(2n − 2nmB1 )β−1
βs
+ φ − km] (3.17)
The marginal consumer between adopting A and waiting is m = mA1 , and is obtained by solving
VA(mA1 ) = V∅(m
A
1 ). Similarly, the marginal consumer between adopting B and waiting is m = 1−mB1 ,
and is obtained by solving VB(1 − mB1 ) = V∅(1 − mB1 ). If mA1 and mB1 are both between 0 and 1/2,
then we are consistent with Case 1.
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To ease the computational burden, I pick the parameter value β = 2 to show the existence of a
“market split and adoption delay” equilibrium.
The marginal consumers when β = 2 are:
mA1 (N
A
1 ) =
−NA1 (y − c) + n(y − c) − ks − 2sφ
2[(y − c)n − 2ks] (3.18)
mB1 (N
A
1 ) =
NA1 (y − c) − ks − 2sφ
2[(y − c)n − 2ks] (3.19)
When β = 2, the sum of mA1 (N
A
1 ) and m
B
1 (N
A
1 ) is independent of the value of N
A
1 .
Knowing consumers’ adoption strategies (mA1 (N
A
1 ) and m
B
1 (N
B
1 )), the total profit of a period-1
firm from adopting platform A is
piA(NA1 ) = pi
A
1 (N
A
1 ) +
1
2
piA2 (N
A
1 ; /) +
1
2
piA2 (N
A
1 ; .)
=
mA1 (y − c)
2NA1
− F + 1
2
(
mA1 (y − c)
4nmA1
− F) + 1
2
(
(1 − mB1 )(y − c)
4n(1 − mB1 )
− F)
=
mA1 (y − c)
2NA1
+
y − c
4n
− 2F
=
ks + 2sφ + NA1 (y − c) − n(y − c)
2[2ks − n(y − c)] ·
y − c
2NA1
+
y − c
4n
− 2F (3.20)
Similarly, the total profit of a period-1 firm from adopting platform B is
piB(NA1 ) = pi
B
1 (N
A
1 ) +
1
2
piB2 (N
A
1 ; /) +
1
2
piB2 (N
A
1 ; .)
=
mB1 (y − c)
2(n − NA1 )
− F + 1
2
(
(1 − mA1 )(y − c)
4n(1 − mA1 )
− F) + 1
2
(
mB1 (y − c)
4nmB1
− F)
=
mB1 (y − c)
2(n − NA1 )
+
y − c
4n
− 2F
=
ks + 2sφ − NA1 (y − c)
2[2ks − n(y − c)] ·
y − c
2(n − NA1 )
+
y − c
4n
− 2F (3.21)
86
200 400 600 800
N1A
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
profit
A B
Figure 3.5: Period 1 - Total Profits (β = 2)
The first-order derivatives are
dpiA(NA1 )
dNA1
=
(y − c)(ks + 2sφ − n(y − c))
4(NA1 )
2(n(y − c) − 2ks) (3.22)
and
dpiB(NA1 )
dNA1
=
(y − c)(n(y − c) − ks − 2sφ)
4(n − NA1 )2(n(y − c) − 2ks)
. (3.23)
So piA(NA1 ) decreases in N
A
1 if 1) 0 < k < 2φ, and 0 < y−c < 2ksn or y−c > ks+2sφn ; or 2) k > 2φ, and
0 < y − c < ks+2sφn or y − c > 2ksn . And when piA(NA1 ) decreases in NA1 , piB(NA1 ) will be increasing
in NA1 . If pi
A(NA1 ) increases and pi
B(NA1 ) decreases in N
A
1 , there will be no market split equilibrium
and all firms will adopt platform A or all firms adopt platform B. If this case happens, we will no
longer have 0 < mA1 ,m
B
1 < 1/2.
2
The profit functions are shown in Figure 3.5. The intersection of two profit functions happens
exactly at NA1 =
n
2 , i.e., half of the period-1 firms adopt platform A and the other half adopt platform
B.
Proposition 4. If the parameters satisfy any one of the three conditions,
2In particular, there does not exist any parameter values such that both
dpiA(NA1 )
dNA1
> 0 and 0 < mA1 (N
A
1 = 0),m
B
1 (N
A
1 =
0) < 1/2 hold, or both
dpiA(NA1 )
dNA1
> 0 and 0 < mA1 (N
A
1 = n),m
B
1 (N
A
1 = n) < 1/2 hold.
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1) 0 < k ≤ 2φ, and y − c > 2ks+4sφn ; or
2) 2φ < k ≤ 6φ, and 0 < y − c < 2ks−4sφn or y − c > 2ks+4sφn ; or
3) k > 6φ, and 0 < y − c < ks+2sφn or y − c > 2ks+4sφn .
Then there exists a “Market-Split-and-Adoption-Delay” equilibrium where 14− sφn(y−c)−2ks consumers
adopt platform A and the same number of consumers adopt platform B (i.e., mA1 = m
B
1 =
1
4 −
sφ
n(y−c)−2ks ) and the period-1 firms split evenly between two platforms (i.e., N
A
1 = N
B
1 =
n
2 ). There
are 1 − mA1 − mB1 = 12 + 2sφn(y−c)−2ks > 0 consumers choosing to wait in period 1 and adopt in period
2 after the dominant platform reveals.
If one of the three conditions in proposition 4 holds, the profit functions from adopting either
platform as shown in Figure 3.5 imply that the competition effect dominates the network effect.
For example, as the number of firms that adopt platform A increases, the profit from adopting A
decreases.
When there is no dynamics in the adoption problem, as in Church and Gandal [1992], if param-
eters fall into the range (3.9), firms’ profit from adopting either platform shows that the network
effect dominates the competition effect when (3.9) holds.3 See Figure 3.6 in the appendix. In that
case (i.e., the “Case 2” in Church and Gandal [1992]), there are only standardization equilibria,
i.e., all firms and consumers adopt one platform.
When we have dynamics in the adoption process and allow consumers to wait, this will change
firms’ profits and make the competition effect dominate the network effect, as Figure 3.5 shows.
Then we will have this “market split and adoption delay” equilibrium as in Proposition 4.
3.5 Conclusion
We extend the static adoption model in Church and Gandal [1992] to a two-period dynamic adop-
tion model. The key elements are that 1) consumers may choose to wait in period 1 instead of
adopting right away; and 2) there is a group of new firms enter the market in each period, therefore
the uncertainty about future will enter ealier entrants’ adoption decision.
3When β = 2, the parameter range (3.9) can be reduced to y − c > ksn , which overlaps a lot with the three conditions
in Proposition 4.
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We find that the dynamics may cause significant difference in the results. In a parameter space
that only has standardization equilibria in the static setting, we now have, in the dynamic adoption
model, a “market split and adoption delay” equilibrium where some consumers choose to wait and
firms split everly between two platforms in period 1. In this equilibrium, at the end of the two
periods, we will have both platforms viable with nonzero consumers and firms.
The key reason in the emergence of this new equilibrium is that the network effect is no longer
certain in the first period. When the first-period firms make their adoption decisions, they cannot
predict which platform will become dominant in period 2, therefore, the uncertainty will dampen
the dynamic network effect and the dynamic competition effect will become relatively stronger.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Profit functions in a static setting
When (3.9) holds, the profit functions of adopting either platform will be as shown in Figure 3.6.
This is the Figure 3 on page 96 of Church and Gandal [1992]. We can see that, in a static adoption
setting as in Church and Gandal [1992], the profit from adopting platform A increases with NA, the
network effect dominates the competition effect.
Figure 3.6: Profit functions from Church and Gandal [1992]
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